Physiology and the Controlling of Affects in Kant's Philosophy

Abstract

Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. (MS, 6: 410)Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ (MS, 6: 409). In the Anthropology and the Doctrine of Virtue, apathy is taken in the sense of freedom from affects. In these texts, Kant maintains that we must strive toward a state in which affects are absent.

A Good Enough Heart: Kant and the Cultivation of Emotions

“…Even if we grant that Kant recommends that we cultivate sympathy, it may be sui generis in Kant’s view (cf. Borges 2008: 53–5). The fact that sympathy can be morally valuable does not then allow us to conclude that we should cultivate emotional sensitivity in general.…”

“…Does Kant think that emotions are physiological like pleasure and pain (cf. Sorensen 2002;Borges 2004Deimling 2014; Frierson 2014 a, b)? 20 Are they something more complex that tracks value?…”

“… 3 Borges (2008) has evinced a sceptical view of emotional cultivation as well, though our accounts of emotions differ. …”

“…This, of course, does not preclude us from talking meaningfully about emotions as a category. For further explanations, see Borges (2004, 2008), Deimling (2014) and Frierson (2014a, b).…”

“… 12 While their accounts are by no means univocal, Baron (1995), Sherman (1997), Guyer (1993, 2010), Fahmy (2009) and Borges (2004) all cite this passage as evidence that Kant believes some emotions can be cultivated. Borges (2008) argues that sympathy can be cultivated, but that cultivation does not extend to emotions more generally. …”