Placing Presidential-Congressional Relations in Context: A Comparison of Barack Obama and His Predecessors

Abstract

What better accounts for Barack Obama's success with Congress, his political skills, or aspects of the political context, such as party control of Congress and public approval? To address this question, we update the Bond-Fleisher-Wood (BFW) political context model through 2010. The BFW model accounts for Obama's success vis-à-vis the House, and, to some extent, for the Senate as well. This article argues that increasing party polarization affects the relationship between party control and presidential success differently in the House and Senate. In the supermajoritiarian Senate, greater partisanship diminishes the effects of party control-in other words, as party polarization increases, presidential success declines for both majority and minority presidents. A comparison of Obama's success with that of previous presidents facing a similar context reveals no evidence that Obama has won significantly more often than should be expected given the context. Polity (2013) 45, 105-126.In his first two years in office, Barack Obama could boast of enactment of several landmark pieces of legislation, including economic stimulus, financial industry reform, health care reform, major tax legislation, and repeal of the "Don't AskDon't Tell" policy with regard to gays serving in the military. His success in sponsoring legislation also seems quite impressive. During his first years in office, his legislative proposals won 93 and 86 percent of House votes and 98 and 75 percent of Senate votes. The average success rates for other presidents, who like him, benefited from majority control were 77.5 in the House and 73.9 in the Senate. Given the gridlock, partisan bickering, and party polarization that

Contemporary Presidency: Which Presidents Are Uncommonly Successful in Congress? A Trump Update

“…These results updated through Trump's first two years in office are consistent with earlier studies using different model specifications analyzing earlier periods and presidents (Bond and Fleisher , chap. 8; Cohen, Bond, and Fleisher ; ; Fleisher and Bond ; ; Fleisher, Bond, and Wood ).…”

Political Institutions and the Legislative Success of Brazilian Presidents: an Analysis of the Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff Governments

“…Furthermore, there is still a long time to go before the next elections, which in theory leads deputies focus on the legislative process, rather than strategies for re-election which become more signi icant during the inal years of a legislative term. Alemán and Navia (2009) in the Chilean case and Cohen et al (2013) in the US case ind evidence that this variable has a positive effect on the approval of executive projects. However, Canes-Wrone and Marchi (2002) ind no clear evidence of an electoral cycle effect.…”

“…Therefore, this argument is based on the need for negotiation between the president and members of congress on a case-by-case basis, so the cost for support is high and there is no guarantee that it will in fact be sustained. collaborate; 04. the president's popularity vis-à-vis the electorate -high approval of the president being an incentive for deputies seeking re-election to support the president's legislative agenda; 05. and the electoral calendar -whereby the more distant the election, the greater the chances of presidents receiving political support because the concern with re-election is not a pressing issue for deputies (BOND and FLEISHER, 1990;COHEN et al, 2013;DAVIDSON, 1984;EDWARDS et al, 1997;NEUSTADT, 1960).…”

Constituent Approval, Electoral Marginality, and Congressional Support for the President

“…A second approach uses national approval, sometimes disaggregated by party (Edwards ; Bond and Fleisher ; Bond, Fleisher, and Northrup 1988). And a third approach aggregates congressional support to the chamber level and thus looks at the impact of national approval on chamber‐level support (Beckmann ; Bond and Fleisher ; Bond et al ; Brace and Hinckley ; Canes‐Wrone and De Marchi ; Cohen ; Cohen, Bond, and Fleisher ; Lebo and O'Geen ; Lockerbie, Borrelli, and Hedger ; Ostrom and Simon ; Peterson ; Rivers and Rose ).…”