Plato on the Psychology of Pleasure and Pain

Abstract

The thesis that the just man is happier than the unjust is, arguably, the most important thesis to Plato's project in the Republic. This overarching thesis first emerges in the context of Glaucon's challenge in Book 2, but it is not until much later in the Republic that Plato completes his argument for it: after much preparatory work (including the grand metaphysics of the central books) Plato offers three proofs of this thesis in Book 9. The second and third of these aim to make the case by showing that the philosopher's life is more pleasant than all the competing lives-those of honor-lovers, oligarchs, democrats, and tyrants. 1 The third proof, however, stands out: it is where Plato presents his account of pleasure and pain-his most comprehensive account until the Philebus. More importantly, Plato deems this proof the "greatest and most decisive" argument for the thesis in question (583b6-7). The merits of this particular proof, therefore, are of utmost importance for our evaluation of Plato's contention that the just man is happiest. Given the significance of this view for the Republic, our evaluation of this dialogue itself should be greatly informed by the soundness or otherwise of this proof.The received view about this proof, however, has been not only negative but dismissive as well: the account of pleasure on which it is based has been treated as an ill-conceived and deeply flawed account that Plato thankfully retracted and replaced in the Philebus. 2 I am convinced, however, that this received view of the Republic's account is false. In this paper, I will not concern myself with whether, or in what way, Plato's account of pleasure in the Republic falls short of what we find in the Philebus, but will rather focus on the merits of the former. MyThe reading offered in this paper is based on a chapter of my PhD dissertation. For helpful comments on my interpretation at the early stages of its evolution, I am thankful to Jim Hankinson,