the second proof (580d-583a), Plato classifies all pleasures as belonging to one of the three parts of the soul, and identifies the pleasures of the rational part as the philosopher's/ philosophical pleasures. These pleasures are, of course, the pleasures that are distinctive of a philosophical life, as opposed to the pleasures that a philosopher shares with non-philosophers.

's Categories1 classifies entities by using two predication relations, being 'said of' a subject and being 'in' a subject.2 Four kinds of entity emerge from this classification: (i) things that are neither 'said of' nor 'in' a subject; (ii) things that are 'said of' a subject but not 'in' a subject; (iii) things that are both 'said of' a subject and 'in' a subject; and (iv) things that are 'in' a subject but not 'said of' a subject.3It is clear what sorts of entities belong in the first three of these classes: Socrates, man (the species), and colour (the species), respectively. But the nature of entities in the fourth class-that of non-substantial individuals-has been a matter of intense debate over the past few decades. The traditionally accepted view, which I shall call the 'traditional view', is that a non-substantial individual is a property that cannot be shared by (be 'in') more than one individual substance; thus, on this view, the individual white 'in' Socrates ã Mehmet M. Erginel 2004 I am grateful to David Sedley for his valuable suggestions, and to Alex Mourelatos for commenting on several drafts of this paper. I also wish to thank Ed Allaire, Matt Evans, Jim Hankinson, Iain Morrisson, and David Sosa for their comments.1 In this paper I mostly rely on, but occasionally di•er from, J. L. Ackrill's translation in Aristotle: Categories and De interpretatione [Categories], translation and notes (Oxford, 1963).2 I shall use the terms 'said of' and 'in' in quotation marks when they are meant in Aristotle's technical sense. Likewise, it is the technical sense of 'in' that is meant when I refer to the 'x is in y' relation.3 Aristotle's classification of entities into four kinds based on the two predication relations was the first formulation of a theory which has largely dominated the history of metaphysics; the four classes have been traditionally known as: (a) individual substances, (b) universal substances, (c) universal accidents, and (d) individual accidents, corresponding to (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) above, respectively. See I. Angelelli, 'Accidents, III: The Ontological Square', in H. Burkhardt and B. Smith (eds.),

In this paper I aim to show that the restoration model of pleasure as we find it in Plato’s Gorgias, Republic, Timaeus, and Philebus contains a common psychological core, despite the substantial developments and greater sophistication in the later works. I argue that, contrary to the scholarly consensus, all four dialogues take the necessary condition for pain to be a state of imbalance or disharmony rather than a process of destruction or deterioration. Given that the necessary condition for pleasure is a process of restoration, it follows that the restoration model offers a strikingly asymmetrical account of pleasure and pain. This unorthodox interpretation of pain is not only favoured by the textual evidence but is also more charitable, as it attributes to Plato a more plausible view of impure pleasures, a more realistic account of desire, and a more compelling argument for the greater pleasantness of the philosophical life.

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