INCONSISTENCY AND AMBIGUITY IN <i>REPUBLIC</i> IX

Erginel, Mehmet M.

doi:10.1017/s000983881100005x

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“…36 A coerência entre os argumentos oferecidos nos passos 583b-585a e 585a-587a é fruto de muito debate entre os intérpretes. Para maiores detalhes, ver ERGINEL 2011e WOLFSDORF 2012 Trad. Guinsburg.…”

Section: Os Limites Da Noção Do Prazer Como Preenchimentounclassified

A fisiologia do prazer no livro IX da República e os seus problemas

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2017

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Resumo. Este artigo tem o objetivo de apontar alguns dos problemas decorrentes da concepção fisiológica do prazer apresentada por Platão no livro IX da República. Inicialmente, apresentarei como Platão lida com o tema do prazer no Górgias, destacando o papel de uma certa fisiologia nutricional em tal contexto. Em seguida, veremos que Platão lida com o tema do prazer no penúltimo livro da República de um modo mais amplo, uma vez que este diálogo fornece exemplos além da esfera nutricional. Apesar da abrangente discussão sobre o prazer na República mencionar os prazeres intelectuais, não encontramos uma acurada descrição dos mesmos nesse diálogo. Um dos obstáculos para a compreensão de tais tipos de prazeres diz respeito à controversa concepção fisiológica do prazer psíquico como um processo de preenchimento. Assim, chamaremos atenção na última seção para a frequente analogia entre corpo e alma no pensamento de Platão com o intuito de contribuir para as discussões sobre o prazer na República. Palavras-chave: Platão, prazer, Górgias, República, fisiologiaAbstract. This article intends to point out some problems arising from the physiological conception of pleasure presented by Plato in Republic Book IX. Initially, I will show how Plato addresses the theme of pleasure in the Gorgias, highlighting the role of a kind of nutritional physiology in such context. Next, we will see Plato returns to the theme of pleasure in the penultimate book of the Republic in a more comprehensive way since this dialogue provides examples beyond nutritional sphere. Although the extensive discussion on pleasure in the Republic mentions intellectual pleasures, it does not provide us an accurate description of them. One of problems for the correct understanding of such types of pleasures concerns the controversial conception of psychic pleasures as a process of replenishment. Thus, in the last section, I will draw attention

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Section: Os Limites Da Noção Do Prazer Como Preenchimentounclassified

A fisiologia do prazer no livro IX da República e os seus problemas

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2017

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“…For a more direct criticism of Plato on this point, seeUrmson 1984. I offer a defense of Plato's view inErginel 2006, where I focus on this particular mistake.6 Though Socrates' examples (mentioned above) are cases of people who mistake the neutral state for pleasure while in pain, the unqualified statement that the neutral state appears pleasant when it is next to what is painful-and not that it appears so while one is in pain-shows that the mistake takes place while at the neutral state as well. This reading is further supported by the metaphor of up-down-middle (584d6-9), which I discuss in detail below.…”

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Plato on the Psychology of Pleasure and Pain

Erginel¹

2011

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The thesis that the just man is happier than the unjust is, arguably, the most important thesis to Plato's project in the Republic. This overarching thesis first emerges in the context of Glaucon's challenge in Book 2, but it is not until much later in the Republic that Plato completes his argument for it: after much preparatory work (including the grand metaphysics of the central books) Plato offers three proofs of this thesis in Book 9. The second and third of these aim to make the case by showing that the philosopher's life is more pleasant than all the competing lives-those of honor-lovers, oligarchs, democrats, and tyrants. 1 The third proof, however, stands out: it is where Plato presents his account of pleasure and pain-his most comprehensive account until the Philebus. More importantly, Plato deems this proof the "greatest and most decisive" argument for the thesis in question (583b6-7). The merits of this particular proof, therefore, are of utmost importance for our evaluation of Plato's contention that the just man is happiest. Given the significance of this view for the Republic, our evaluation of this dialogue itself should be greatly informed by the soundness or otherwise of this proof.The received view about this proof, however, has been not only negative but dismissive as well: the account of pleasure on which it is based has been treated as an ill-conceived and deeply flawed account that Plato thankfully retracted and replaced in the Philebus. 2 I am convinced, however, that this received view of the Republic's account is false. In this paper, I will not concern myself with whether, or in what way, Plato's account of pleasure in the Republic falls short of what we find in the Philebus, but will rather focus on the merits of the former. MyThe reading offered in this paper is based on a chapter of my PhD dissertation. For helpful comments on my interpretation at the early stages of its evolution, I am thankful to Jim Hankinson,

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The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists

Warren¹

2014

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Human lives are full of pleasures and pains. And humans are creatures that are able to think: to learn, understand, remember and recall, plan and anticipate. Ancient philosophers were interested in both of these facts and, what is more, were interested in how these two facts are related to one another. There appear to be, after all, pleasures and pains associated with learning and inquiring, recollecting and anticipating. We enjoy finding something out. We are pained to discover that a belief we hold is false. We can think back and enjoy or be upset by recalling past events. And we can plan for and enjoy imagining pleasures yet to come. This book is about what Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics had to say about these relationships between pleasure and reason.

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INCONSISTENCY AND AMBIGUITY IN REPUBLIC IX

Cited by 8 publications

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A fisiologia do prazer no livro IX da República e os seus problemas

A fisiologia do prazer no livro IX da República e os seus problemas

Plato on the Psychology of Pleasure and Pain

The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists

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