Plato's "Charmides" and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality

Schmid, Walter Thomas

doi:10.2307/4352362

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Nonetheless, a considerable number of scholars also believe that conceiving of the soul as the whole in Chrm. 156e1-157a3 seems to be an unavoidable or at least plausible reading 17 [34][35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45].…”

Section: The Soul and The Whole: The Analogies In Charmides 156e1-157a3mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[40,49]. Relevant to this interpretation is the view that the soul is the most important part of the person, in the sense that it is the part that can make the person whole [41] (p. 17). In these last two interpretations we can also speak of the soul as a "whole", not literally but as much as it is the most important causal factor of health or the most important causal factor for the person's integrity.…”

Section: The Soul and The Whole: The Analogies In Charmides 156e1-157a3mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…17 Tuckey [35] (p. 18) seems to read in this way; see also Philip [36] and Bruell [37] p. 147, n.13. Hyland [38] (p. 41) believes that Socrates comes close to suggesting that a firm distinction between the body and the soul cannot even be consistently maintained; see also Coolidge [39] (p. 26), Hazebroucq [40] (p. 118), Schmid [41] (p. 17), Benardete [42] (p. 239), McPherran [34] (p. 18), Levine [43] (p. 67), Korobili and Stefou [44] (pp. 210-211), [45] (p. 66), who offer a specific interpretation of the "whole".…”

Section: Conflicts Of Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Soul as Principle in Plato’s Charmides: A Reading of Plato’s Anthropological Ontology Based on Hermias Alexandrinus on Plato’s Phaedrus

Mouzala

2024

Philosophies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper aims to interpret the role of the soul as ontological, intellectual or cognitive and as the moral principle within the frame of the holistic conception of human psychosomatic health that emerges from the context of Zalmoxian medicine in the proemium of Plato’s Charmides. It examines what the ontological status of the soul is in relation to the body and the body–soul complex of man considered as a psychosomatic whole. By comparing the presentation of the soul as principle in the Charmides and the Phaedrus, the paper defends the thesis that in the former dialogue, Plato develops his own anthropological ontology, which paves the way for the salvation of human existence and health. The soul is bestowed with an ontological primacy that determines the philosophical and medical presuppositions for treating human illness under a holistic view. The interpretation of the ontological relation of the soul to the body and the entire human being in the context of Zalmoxian holistic medicine is based on Hermias Alexandrinus’ exegesis of the conception of the soul as principle in the Phaedrus. This paper demonstrates that, from both the medical holistic viewpoint and the anthropological philosophical perspective, the soul is the principle and πρῶτον with regard to the body and the body–soul complex without being the whole that the corresponding medical epistemology must apprehend.

show abstract

Section: The Soul and The Whole: The Analogies In Charmides 156e1-157a3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Soul and The Whole: The Analogies In Charmides 156e1-157a3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conflicts Of Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Soul as Principle in Plato’s Charmides: A Reading of Plato’s Anthropological Ontology Based on Hermias Alexandrinus on Plato’s Phaedrus

Mouzala

2024

Philosophies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

Moore

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this book, the first systematic study of Socrates's reflections on self-knowledge, Christopher Moore examines the ancient precept 'Know yourself' and, drawing on Plato, Aristophanes, Xenophon, and others, reconstructs and reassesses the arguments about self-examination, personal ideals, and moral maturity at the heart of the Socratic project. What has been thought to be a purely epistemological or metaphysical inquiry turns out to be deeply ethical, intellectual, and social. Knowing yourself is more than attending to your beliefs, discerning the structure of your soul, or recognizing your ignorance - it is constituting yourself as a self who can be guided by knowledge toward the good life. This is neither a wholly introspective nor a completely isolated pursuit: we know and constitute ourselves best through dialogue with friends and critics. This rich and original study will be of interest to researchers in the philosophy of Socrates, selfhood, and ancient thought.

show abstract

Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions

Wolfsdorf¹

2003

Phronesis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

ÒSocratesÕ Pursuit of De nitionsÓ examines the manner in which Socrates pursues de nitions in PlatoÕs early de nitional dialogues and advances the following claims. Socrates evaluates de nitions (proposed by his interlocutors or himself) by considering their consistency with conditions of the identity of F (Fconditions) to which he is committed. In evaluating proposed de nitions, Socrates seeks to determine their truth-value. Socrates evaluates the truth-value of a proposed de nition by considering the consistency of the proposed de nition with F-conditions that F he believes to be true. (For instance, a proposed de nitionÕs inconsistency with one of these gives Socrates reason to believe that the de nition is false.) SocratesÕ belief in the truth of a given F-condition to which he is committed may be based on self-evidence, its endoxic status, experience, or deduction from premises to which he is committed on the basis of any of the previous three. However, Socrates does not consider the epistemological grounds of his commitments to his F-conditions. This is part of a general avoidance of metaethical and ethical epistemological issues. Due to his avoidance of these, SocratesÕ pursuit of true de nitions is theoretically na ve. However, Socrates recognizes a certain limitation to his manner of pursuing de nitions.These results are applied to advancing the following further points.(1) Although Socrates has a distinctive manner or style of pursuing de nitions, it is inappropriate to ascribe to him a method of doing so in the following sense. The concept of method implies a certain theoretical conception of procedure that Socrates lacks. Moreover, according to SocratesÕ own conceptual framework, only one who possessed the relevant t¡xnh would have a method. (2) Furthermore, SocratesÕ manner of pursuing de nitions is not elenctic just insofar as the word ÒelenchusÓ is interpreted to have adversarial connotations; that is inconsistent with SocratesÕ motives and interests. (3) SocratesÕ manner of pursuing de nitions is consistent among the early de nitional dialogues. More speci cally, there is no Òdemise of the elenchusÓ in a set of transitional dialogues, as Vlastos describes it. First, SocratesÕ manner of pursuing de nitions is not ÒelencticÓ (in the sense described). And, second, the fact that Socrates himself proposes de nitions in allegedly post-elenctic dialogues (that is, Lysis and Hippias Major) is consistent with his manner of pursuing de nitions. (4) In the early de nitional dialogues, © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003Phronesis XLVIII/4 Also available onlinewww.brill.nl Accepted June 2003 1 Some scholars lament the enormity of secondary literature on Plato. But I have always been grateful for it. This paper was written in a kind of isolation. The rst person to read or comment on it was an anonymous referee for Phronesis. Yet the paper would have been nothing had I not had the opportunity to think its problems over in light of previous contributions to the topic. My debts are plentiful and duly acknowledged...

show abstract

Plato's "Charmides" and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Soul as Principle in Plato’s Charmides: A Reading of Plato’s Anthropological Ontology Based on Hermias Alexandrinus on Plato’s Phaedrus

Soul as Principle in Plato’s Charmides: A Reading of Plato’s Anthropological Ontology Based on Hermias Alexandrinus on Plato’s Phaedrus

Socrates and Self-Knowledge

Socrates' Pursuit of Definitions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About