Platonic Dispositionalism

Tugby, Matthew

doi:10.1093/mind/fzt071

Cited by 84 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…I remain neutral on debates about properties that are orthogonal to the issues of this paper, such as between Platonism and Aristotelianism (Tugby 2013;Armstrong 1997); whether dispositions have stimuli or reciprocal disposition partners (Bird 2007b;Martin 2008); whether properties are tropes or universals (Molnar 2003;Armstrong 1997) and whether dispositions are single-track or multi-track (Bird 2007b;Vetter 2013). …”

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confidence: 98%

Powerful qualities and pure powers

Taylor

2017

Philos Stud

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Many think that properties are powers. However, whilst some claim that properties are pure powers, others claim that properties are powerful qualities. In this paper, I argue that the canonical formulation of the powerful qualities view (advocated by John Heil, C. B. Martin and others) is no different from the pure powers view. Contrary to appearances, the two positions accept the same view of properties. Thus, the debate between them rests on an illusion. I draw out some consequences of this surprising result for issues over property individuation. Along the way, I argue that all existing objections to the powerful qualities view fail.

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confidence: 98%

Powerful qualities and pure powers

Taylor

2017

Philos Stud

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“…There are inconsistent predicates, of course, but they do not correspond to any universals. Only consistent predicates correspond to universals ' (1990: 203 Tugby 2013). There is also the important question of how platonists should understand possible worlds talk, which is pervasive in modal semantics.…”

Section: Concluding Remarks: Extending Platonismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The alien paradox

Tugby

2014

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“…In other words, platonic properties are ways concrete things can be rather than just ways things are, and as a result are typically assumed to be necessary existents (for examples of those who associate platonism with the necessary existence of properties, see Armstrong , p. 125, Bird , p. 64, Bostock , p.518, Cowling forthcoming, §. 4, Oderberg , p. 7, and Tugby , §. 5.…”

Section: The Platonic Necessitarian Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%