Powerful qualities and pure powers

Taylor, Henry

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0918-1

Cited by 35 publications

(52 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…I have recently argued that the identity theory and the pure powers view collapse into the same view (Taylor 2018). Call this the collapse argument.…”

Section: Powerful Qualitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The collapse argument runs as follows (for full details, see Taylor 2018). The supposed difference between the identity theory and the pure powers view lies in the fact that the former claims that properties are qualities, whilst the latter claims that properties are 'purely' powerful.…”

Section: The Collapse Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The points about the collapse argument made just now apply to all of these. Both the pure powers theorist and the identity theorist will accept that there are a variety of concepts and descriptions that we can use to think about and refer to properties (Taylor 2017(Taylor , 2018(Taylor , pp. 1428(Taylor -1429.…”

Section: The Collapse Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…argument. I first summarise the reasons to think that the identity theory faces the regress (for full details, see Taylor 2018Taylor , pp. 1435Taylor -1438.…”

Section: The Regress Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Powerful Problems for Powerful Qualities

Taylor

2019

Erkenn

Self Cite

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The powerful qualities view of properties is currently enjoying a surge in popularity. Recently, I have argued that the standard version of the view (associated with C.B. Martin and John Heil) is no different from a rival view: the pure powers position. I have also argued that the canonical version of the powerful qualities view faces the same problem as the pure powers view: the dreaded regress objection. Joaquim Giannotti disagrees. First, Giannotti thinks that the standard version of the powerful qualities view can be differentiated from the pure powers view. Second, Giannotti argues that the powerful qualities view is not susceptible to the regress objection. Third, he argues that there is another reasonable version of the powerful qualities view available, which makes use of the notion of 'aspects'. In this note, I respond to Giannotti. I argue that all three of Giannotti's arguments are unsuccessful.

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“…I have recently argued that the identity theory and the pure powers view collapse into the same view (Taylor 2018). Call this the collapse argument.…”

Section: Powerful Qualitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Collapse Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Collapse Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…argument. I first summarise the reasons to think that the identity theory faces the regress (for full details, see Taylor 2018Taylor , pp. 1435Taylor -1438.…”

Section: The Regress Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Powerful Problems for Powerful Qualities

Taylor

2019

Erkenn

Self Cite

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“…But we can also argue that when we think of a property as a qualitative/categorical concept 5 we are not thinking of a part or an aspect of the property, but are thinking of the whole property in a certain way. Equally, to think of the property as a dispositional concept is not to think only of an aspect of the property but again to consider the whole property in a certain different way [33,34]. 6 4 "Of the many ways of characterizing a power, the only one that reveals the nature (identity) of the power is the characterization in terms of its manifestation" [25] (p.63).…”

Section: Dispositions and Powersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Categories and Dispositions. A New Look at the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Properties

Lanfredini

2018

Philosophies

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The distinction between primary and secondary properties establishes the absolute priority, both ontological and epistemological, of quantity (objective and measurable) over quality (subjective and ineffable). In between the two properties, primary and secondary, are the dispositional properties, for example fragility, malleability, rigidity, and so on. But, from an ontological point of view, what are dispositional properties? This contribution takes into consideration two possible answers to this question: the one according to which the dispositional properties are invariant in variation and another according to which they are powers. The second answer is in turn subject to two different interpretations. We can consider dispositions, or powers, as integrally reducible to behavioral events (solubility, for example, is reduced to the fact that a certain substance melts when immersed in a certain liquid), or physical (the fragility of glass, for example, is reduced to the physical structure underlying it). However, we can consider powers as ontologically autonomous and not-grounded. This contribution aims to investigate the latter solution, with particular reference to the apparently oxymoronic notion of physical intentionality. This notion will provide a new, dynamic, and evolutionary version of the concept of disposition and at the same time offer a new look at the distinction between primary and secondary properties. This is a fortiori true since Galileo refers to triangles, circles, etc., that is to geometry.Philosophies 2018, 3, 43 2 of 12 wet; if we look at snow and then at the sun, what at first was white appears yellow; sugar seems to taste bitter when we are ill, and so on); mutually conflicting (a surface can seem smooth to the eye but rough to the touch); erroneous (as in any type of hallucination in which we see things that do not really exist); ambiguous (as in famous Gestalt figures such as the duck-rabbit).As is well known, Descartes signals an irreversible turn in relations between body and mind, and above all in the nature of the mental. The mind becomes something specifically immaterial, a substance separate from bodies (our own body included), totally extraneous to the material order of the world. Descartes' idea is this: the physical world is a great mechanism whose functioning is mathematically described by quantitative physics. The sole exception is thought, which does not allow itself to be reduced to such a mechanism and is substantially extraneous to the material and natural world. Quantitative-mathematical explanations can therefore be applied to everything, with the sole exception of the human mind. Thus, we come to create that explanatory void which is at the origin of the tension present in what Ryle calls the official theory of mind [1]: that is, mind-body dualism. In Descartes, this ontological antireductionism is the direct consequence of total adhesion to the scientific revolution initiated by Galileo. The presupposition is that if, in an illusion, even bodies are not as they actua...

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Construction

Gronda¹

2020

Synthese Library

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Powerful qualities and pure powers

Cited by 35 publications

References 29 publications

Powerful Problems for Powerful Qualities

Powerful Problems for Powerful Qualities

Categories and Dispositions. A New Look at the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Properties

Construction

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