Platypus: Offchain Protocol Without Synchrony

Ranchal-Pedrosa, Alejandro; Gramoli, Vincent

doi:10.1109/nca.2019.8935037

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Moreover, payment rejection can be deliberately made by a rival adversary. In contrast, users face obstacles in completing transactions, impacting the reputation of the payment protocol or nondeliberate due to some participants' greediness to maximize profits, which imposes further implications [91]- [93]. Extensive research has been conducted, and the subsequent sections will explore and analyse the latest proposed solutions.…”

Section: Privacymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The protocol uses Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) a better version of ZKP and employs onion routing for anonymous communication among path participants. Platypus, introduced by Ranchala-Pedrosa and Garmoli [91], addresses scalability limitations in the Bitcoin network using a sidechain solution. It offers enhanced privacy and security without relying on synchrony or a trusted execution environment.…”

Section: Privacy and Security-based Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Early Warning of Financial Failurefor Iraqi Banks Based on Robust Adaptive Lasso Logistic Regression

Uraibi,

Abbas

2024

Iraqi Journal for Computer Science and Mathematics

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Blockchain technology era is triggered due to current advancement in the decentralized paradigms via facilitating secure collaboration among untrusted entities consequently superseding the necessity for the trusted third parties’ existence. Notwithstanding its potential, blockchain scalability faces severe limitations such as low throughput, high fees, and confirmation time latency. Several scaling solutions have been proposed, including layer one solutions that substantially require fundamentally amending blockchain underlying infrastructure resulted in further scalability complications. Layer two solutions, specifically Lightning Network, is a successful cryptographic layer built atop of the Bitcoin blockchain that aims to alleviate these implications by deporting transaction processing outside blockchain while ensuring security and consensus inherited from blockchain without compromising its infrastructure. Payment channels form the core of the lightning network, facilitating fast and secure transactions between participants. However, the network encounters substantial obstacles associated with transaction amounts that exceed the current channel capacity, leading to payment failures and limiting its effectiveness. Payment Channel Networks (PCN) have been risen as an evolved replacement that solves payment channel’s issues, seeking to enhance transaction throughput and reduce confirmation delays by solving limited capacities shortages. This paper thoroughly examines PCN efficiency impacting factors that hinder its current adoption growth and avoiding its widespread employment. Additionally, existing solutions are reviewed and categorized based on the PCN building architecture. The research concludes by outlining potential research avenues and future directions to improve the efficiency and practicality of the Lightning Network PCN. This research contribution aids the advent of blockchain layer two technology and participates in its integration into real-world applications.

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Section: Privacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Privacy and Security-based Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Early Warning of Financial Failurefor Iraqi Banks Based on Robust Adaptive Lasso Logistic Regression

Uraibi,

Abbas

2024

Iraqi Journal for Computer Science and Mathematics

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“…Other approaches [14,23,25] rely on a separate blockchain that plays the same role as our transaction manager (cf. Sect.…”

Section: Other Cross-chain Technologiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5.2). However, [25] and [23] do not aim at ensuring liveness, and [14] aims at ensuring liveness only in periods where communication proceeds synchronously. Wood [25] proposes a multi-chain solution that aims at combining heterogeneous blockchains together without trust.…”

Section: Other Cross-chain Technologiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As far as we know, it has not been proved that the protocol terminates. Ranchal-Pedrosa and Gramoli [23] relax the synchrony assumption using an alternative 'child' blockchain to the so-called 'parent' blockchain in order to execute a series of transfers outside the parent blockchain. This protocol does not guarantee that the intermediary transfers on the child blockchain eventually take effect.…”

Section: Other Cross-chain Technologiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cross-chain payment protocols with success guarantees

2023

Self Cite

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In this paper, we consider the problem of cross-chain payment whereby customers of different escrows—implemented by a bank or a blockchain smart contract—successfully transfer digital assets without trusting each other. Prior to this work, cross-chain payment problems did not require this success, or any form of progress. We introduce a new specification formalism called Asynchronous Networks of Timed Automata to formalise such protocols. We present the first cross-chain payment protocol that ensures termination in a bounded amount of time and works correctly in the presence of clock drift. We then demonstrate that it is impossible to solve this problem without assuming synchrony, in the sense that each message is guaranteed to arrive within a known amount of time. Yet, we solve an eventually terminating weaker variant of this problem, where success is conditional on the patience of the participants, without assuming synchrony, and in the presence of Byzantine failures. We also discuss the relation with the recently defined cross-chain deals.

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Hedging Against Sore Loser Attacks in Cross-Chain Transactions

Xue

Herlihy

2021

Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing

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A sore loser attack in cross-blockchain commerce rises when one party decides to halt participation partway through, leaving other parties' assets locked up for a long duration. Although vulnerability to sore loser attacks cannot be entirely eliminated, it can be reduced to an arbitrarily low level. This paper proposes new distributed protocols for hedging a range of cross-chain transactions in a synchronous communication model, such as two-party swaps, -party swaps, brokered transactions, and auctions.

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Platypus: Offchain Protocol Without Synchrony

Cited by 4 publications

References 15 publications

The Early Warning of Financial Failurefor Iraqi Banks Based on Robust Adaptive Lasso Logistic Regression

The Early Warning of Financial Failurefor Iraqi Banks Based on Robust Adaptive Lasso Logistic Regression

Cross-chain payment protocols with success guarantees

Hedging Against Sore Loser Attacks in Cross-Chain Transactions

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