Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud

Hou, Wenxuan; Moore, Geoff

doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0858-1

Cited by 106 publications

(69 citation statements)

References 36 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The potential limitation of this and previous studies is that the detected and disclosed fraud is only a small subset of total fraud. Furthermore, in the specific context of China, fraud detection as we noted may be lower in SOEs than in non-SOEs because of political motivations (Hou and Moore, 2010). However, this effect should be mitigated by the introduction of the new "Solutions for Listed Firms Checks" regulation in 2001 that increased the general severity of the regulatory environment (Hou and Moore, 2010).…”

Section: Samplementioning

confidence: 85%

“…They show that the "fixed" part of executive compensation (e.g., base salary, bonus, and stipends) tends to decrease after the announcement of an enforcement action by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Other studies analyzing the determinants of corporate fraud have highlighted the importance of corporate oversight and ownership (Chen et al, 2006;Hou and Moore, 2010;Firth et al, 2011). Yet, none of these studies have explored the effect of equity incentives in the form of executive stockholdings on corporate fraud.…”

Section: Previous Literature and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hou and Moore (2010) suggest that fraud detection differs between SOEs and non-SOEs due to political connections. They show that SOEs face less scrutiny from enforcement authorities.…”

Section: H2mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several researchers have found that board composition and ownership structure can affect the incidence of fraud (Chen et al, 2006;Jia et al, 2009;Hou and Moore, 2010). Managers' equity incentives, which are intended to control risk-taking behavior and align long-term investment policies with shareholders' interests, may also have an impact.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper explores how managers' and supervisors' equity incentives impact the likelihood of committing corporate fraud in Chinese-listed firms. Previous research has shown that corporate fraud in China is a widespread phenomenon and has severe consequences for affected firms and executives. However, our understanding of the reasons fraud is committed in a Chinese setting have been very limited thus far. This is an increasingly important topic, because corporate governance is rapidly changing in China, and it is unclear whether adopting the executive compensation practices of the West is appropriate for Chinese firms. We show that managers' equity incentives increase their propensity to commit corporate fraud. We also find that this effect is more pronounced for state-owned firms. However, we find a negative but not significant relationship between the equity incentives of the supervisory board and the incidence of fraud.

show abstract

Section: Samplementioning

confidence: 85%

Section: Previous Literature and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hou and Moore (2010) suggest that fraud detection differs between SOEs and non-SOEs due to political connections. They show that SOEs face less scrutiny from enforcement authorities.…”

Section: H2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China

2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The influences of the state will stay strong in the area of financial and legal regulation. This will seem to naturally undermine independence in the regulatory and judicial areas [19].…”

Section: Other Financial Market Issues In Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

Is China Playing Fair with Its Economic and Trade Policy?

Carrington¹,

Maniam²,

Subramaniam³

2015

IJTEF

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-China is still progressing from a Marxist-planned economy towards a market-based capitalist economy. During its transition, China has enjoyed an incredible growth rate in GDP. In fact it has been estimated by various sources that its growth for decades has been at least 8%, and possibly up to 17%, and still rising. This paper attempts to firstly analyse if China can continue to retain these rates in the near future and more importantly, is China playing fair in the global market. Some argue that they are not, especially in three areas: international trade dumping, exporting inferior products, and currency manipulation. This paper will look at these three activities carefully to see if China is indeed cheating and not playing fair in the world stage.Index Terms-China trade policies. unfair trade practices, dumping, and currency manipulation.

show abstract

Attribute imbalances and innovation implementation based on grounded theory: A case of Chinese enterprises in Gansu Province

et al. 2023

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The purpose of this study is to explore what are the determinant influencing factors of the dilemma faced by state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in implementing innovation‐driven development strategy (IDDS), to propose a suitable localized theory. It also suggests specific actions to break the post‐effects dilemma with the support of this theory. Based on the innovation‐driven survey data of provincial SOEs in Gansu Province, this study adopts grounded theory to conduct exploratory research. This paper constructs a behavior process model of “pre‐motivation, innovation path, and post‐effects dilemma” to drive SOE's innovation and expounds on the incidence relation among the three. The results show that the external administrative force and institutional mechanism drive have both indirect and direct impacts on the innovation path choice of SOEs. The endogenous drive is distorted by external administrative force and institutional mechanism drive, leading to the limited innovation path choice and post‐effects dilemma. This paper puts forward the theory of “Attribute Imbalance–Weakened Autonomy–Sluggish Innovation” and explains why it is sometimes difficult to implement the IDDS of SOEs. However, there are some regional limitations in the application scenarios of the theory. Whether it has broader implications need to further explore. Future theoretical testing should be conducted with a sample of SOEs in developed market regions. It is possible to study the differences in the degree of government intervention in SOEs, the ways of intervention, and the impact of these differences on SOEs' balancing dual attribute conflicts.

show abstract

Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud

Cited by 106 publications

References 36 publications

Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China

Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China

Is China Playing Fair with Its Economic and Trade Policy?

Attribute imbalances and innovation implementation based on grounded theory: A case of Chinese enterprises in Gansu Province

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About