This paper identifies a new incentive for managers to engage in corporate fraud stemming from the relative performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion tournaments. We document higher propensities to engage in fraud for firms with strong tournament incentives (as proxied for by the CEO pay gap). We posit that the relative performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion tournaments creates incentives to manipulate performance, while the option-like character can motivate managers to engage in risky activities. We thereby extend previous corporate fraud literature that focuses mainly on equity-based incentives and reports mixed findings. Our results are robust to using different fraud samples, and controlling for other known determinants of fraud as well as manager skills. JEL Classification: J33; G30; M53

This paper investigates the relationship between a CEO's foreign experience and CEO compensation. Our analysis is based on the constituent firms of the UK FTSE 350 index from 1999 to 2015. We find that foreign CEOs and national CEOs with foreign working experience receive significantly higher levels of total compensation compared to similar UK CEOs without such characteristics. The results are robust to the endogenous CEO selection using propensity score matching methods, as well as other modelling approaches. Our results show that pay premiums are attributable to the specialized foreign expertise and foreign networks of CEOs, which stem from foreign experience rather than broader general managerial skills. Highlights: • We study the effect of CEO foreign experience on CEO total compensation. • CEO foreign experience is associated with higher CEO total compensation. • The impact is attributable to specialized foreign expertise and foreign networks of CEOs.

This paper explores how managers' and supervisors' equity incentives impact the likelihood of committing corporate fraud in Chinese-listed firms. Previous research has shown that corporate fraud in China is a widespread phenomenon and has severe consequences for affected firms and executives. However, our understanding of the reasons fraud is committed in a Chinese setting have been very limited thus far. This is an increasingly important topic, because corporate governance is rapidly changing in China, and it is unclear whether adopting the executive compensation practices of the West is appropriate for Chinese firms. We show that managers' equity incentives increase their propensity to commit corporate fraud. We also find that this effect is more pronounced for state-owned firms. However, we find a negative but not significant relationship between the equity incentives of the supervisory board and the incidence of fraud.

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This paper investigates the relationship between a CEO's foreign experience and CEO compensation. Our analysis is based on the constituent firms of the UK FTSE 350 index from 1999 to 2015. We find that foreign CEOs and national CEOs with foreign working experience receive significantly higher levels of total compensation compared to similar UK CEOs without such characteristics. The results are robust to the endogenous CEO selection using propensity score matching methods, as well as other modelling approaches. Our results show that pay premiums are attributable to the specialized foreign expertise and foreign networks of CEOs, which stem from foreign experience rather than broader general managerial skills. Highlights:• We study the effect of CEO foreign experience on CEO total compensation.• CEO foreign experience is associated with higher CEO total compensation.• The impact is attributable to specialized foreign expertise and foreign networks of CEOs.