This paper identifies a new incentive for managers to engage in corporate fraud stemming from the relative performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion tournaments. We document higher propensities to engage in fraud for firms with strong tournament incentives (as proxied for by the CEO pay gap). We posit that the relative performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion tournaments creates incentives to manipulate performance, while the option-like character can motivate managers to engage in risky activities. We thereby extend previous corporate fraud literature that focuses mainly on equity-based incentives and reports mixed findings. Our results are robust to using different fraud samples, and controlling for other known determinants of fraud as well as manager skills. JEL Classification: J33; G30; M53

This paper investigates the relationship between a CEO's foreign experience and CEO compensation. Our analysis is based on the constituent firms of the UK FTSE 350 index from 1999 to 2015. We find that foreign CEOs and national CEOs with foreign working experience receive significantly higher levels of total compensation compared to similar UK CEOs without such characteristics. The results are robust to the endogenous CEO selection using propensity score matching methods, as well as other modelling approaches. Our results show that pay premiums are attributable to the specialized foreign expertise and foreign networks of CEOs, which stem from foreign experience rather than broader general managerial skills. Highlights: • We study the effect of CEO foreign experience on CEO total compensation. • CEO foreign experience is associated with higher CEO total compensation. • The impact is attributable to specialized foreign expertise and foreign networks of CEOs.

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This paper investigates the relationship between a CEO's foreign experience and CEO compensation. Our analysis is based on the constituent firms of the UK FTSE 350 index from 1999 to 2015. We find that foreign CEOs and national CEOs with foreign working experience receive significantly higher levels of total compensation compared to similar UK CEOs without such characteristics. The results are robust to the endogenous CEO selection using propensity score matching methods, as well as other modelling approaches. Our results show that pay premiums are attributable to the specialized foreign expertise and foreign networks of CEOs, which stem from foreign experience rather than broader general managerial skills. Highlights:• We study the effect of CEO foreign experience on CEO total compensation.• CEO foreign experience is associated with higher CEO total compensation.• The impact is attributable to specialized foreign expertise and foreign networks of CEOs.

Using a sample of European real estate firms over the 2007-2010 period, this study provides some evidence that measurement-related fair value disclosures reduce information asymmetry. We find a negative association between the extent of fair value disclosures and the bid-ask spread, but no association with two additional measures of information asymmetry (zero returns and price impact). Contrary to our expectation, we fail to find evidence that firms using model estimates exclusively benefit the most from such additional disclosure. Analyzing measurement errors (the absolute difference between the selling price of an asset and its fair value prior to sale), we find that firms that use model estimates exclusively and provide more measurement-related disclosures have lower errors and more accurate fair value estimates. In other words, if our lack of results is due to investors not using this additional disclosure this is to their detriment.