Playing devious games, budget‐emphasis in performance evaluation, and attitudes towards the budgetary process

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of playing devious games on the relationship between budget‐emphasis in performance evaluation and attitudes towards the budgetary process.Design/methodology/approachA survey questionnaire was selected. A hierarchical regression was used to analyze the data gathered from 216 Taiwanese managers in listed companies.FindingsThe results indicate that playing devious games to obtain extra budget requests moderated the relationships of budget‐emphasis in performance evaluation and attitudes towards the budgetary process. The relationships were strong and positive when playing devious games was low, and weak when playing devious games was high.Research limitations/implicationsThe study depends on manager questionnaire responses and thus variations in emotional responses are a concern. In addition, it remains problematic to question managers regarding their engagement in dysfunctional behaviors because managers may not wish to publicize their gaming strategies.Practical implicationsManagers playing devious games to obtain extra budget requests is a significant factor to be considered in attitudes towards the budgetary process. Superiors should communicate with these managers to better understand the purposes of the budget proposals before deciding how to allocate budget resources.Originality/valueThe findings should be useful to superiors in understanding how managerial game‐playing behaviors impact on the relationship between budget‐emphasis in performance evaluation and attitudes towards the budgetary process.

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Sophistication in the Use of Budgeting Practices

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Do Leadership Styles Moderate the Relationship of Organizational Commitment and Budgetary Slack? An Experimental Approach

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