PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of playing devious games on the relationship between budget‐emphasis in performance evaluation and attitudes towards the budgetary process.Design/methodology/approachA survey questionnaire was selected. A hierarchical regression was used to analyze the data gathered from 216 Taiwanese managers in listed companies.FindingsThe results indicate that playing devious games to obtain extra budget requests moderated the relationships of budget‐emphasis in performance evaluation and attitudes towards the budgetary process. The relationships were strong and positive when playing devious games was low, and weak when playing devious games was high.Research limitations/implicationsThe study depends on manager questionnaire responses and thus variations in emotional responses are a concern. In addition, it remains problematic to question managers regarding their engagement in dysfunctional behaviors because managers may not wish to publicize their gaming strategies.Practical implicationsManagers playing devious games to obtain extra budget requests is a significant factor to be considered in attitudes towards the budgetary process. Superiors should communicate with these managers to better understand the purposes of the budget proposals before deciding how to allocate budget resources.Originality/valueThe findings should be useful to superiors in understanding how managerial game‐playing behaviors impact on the relationship between budget‐emphasis in performance evaluation and attitudes towards the budgetary process.

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In this study more positive attitudes towards the budgetary process are examined to see whether or not these cause less favorable attitudes towards budgetary slack, and whether less favorable attitudes towards budgetary slack causes or are caused by behaviors intended to create budgetary slack. The effects are tested using a structural equation model based on questionnaire data gained from 216 Taiwanese managers. The results indicate that more positive attitudes towards the budgetary process result in attitudes less favorable towards budgetary slack. A more favorable attitude towards budgetary slack predicts more frequent incidence of behavior to create budgetary slack and vice versa. The results suggest that the best way to diminish managerial budgetary slack behaviors is to instill in managers more positive attitudes toward the budgetary process and less favorable attitudes towards budgetary slack.

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Questionable accounting practices, sometimes, cause from misusing the concept of materiality to manage their reported earnings. The purpose of this study is to examine the attitudes of accountants concerning the acceptability of 14 questionable accounting practices from the amount of material and immaterial perspectives. The results show that, for all 14 questionable accounting practices, the differences in acceptability between the amount of materiality and immateriality were all statistically significant. Regarding the amount of immateriality, especially for questionable, but still legal accounting practices, accountants appear to have the higher average level of acceptability under the extreme pressure from the top management. While questionable accounting practices are clearly illegal, no matter what the amount is material or immaterial, accountants appear to have the lowest average level of acceptability. This finding may be helpful for businesses and professional associations as they develop their own policies, standards and educational programs regarding dealing with questionable accounting practices