Pleading Guilty: A Voluntary or Coerced Decision?

Abstract

The empirical literature on plea decisions shows that rational motives and coercion may coexist, but there is uncertainty with regard to whether accused feel that their decision is voluntary or made under considerable pressure. However, in most jurisdictions, the legitimacy of the plea bargaining process rests on the Court’s obligation to ensure that the guilty plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly. This study proposes to understand how the accused interpret the rational or coercive elements of their decision-making process and the extent to which their decision to plead guilty is voluntary. Based on semi-structured interviews with twenty convicted individuals, we describe the different decision-making processes, from free and informed decisions to forced decisions to plead guilty while innocent.

Efficiency Over Accuracy?: Exploring Front-Line Practitioners’ Experiences and Opinions on the “Guilty Plea System”

“…The justification of “choice” can also serve to distance legal actors from their role in influencing guilty pleas. For instance, defense lawyers explained their obligation to provide robust legal advice that stresses the benefits of a guilty plea and the risks inherent in proceeding to trial, which Seifman and Freiberg (2001: 67) suggest may “inadvertently [provide an] inducement to the accused to plead guilty.” While prior research indicates that legal advice can significantly influence an innocent defendant's decision to plead guilty (Baldwin and McConville, 1977; Henderson and Levett, 2018; Leclerc and Euvrard, 2019), lawyers in the current study consistently stressed that decisions to plead guilty rest solely on the defendant and that their role is merely to provide advice. As maintained by Legal Aid B, “we can’t make decisions for them, some of them think that's what you are there for, to make a decision.…”

“…Some scholars also outline how the day-to-day operations of the criminal justice system can create an environment conducive to eliciting guilty pleas, regardless of the defendant's guilt or innocence (Erentzen et al, 2021; Roach, 2021; Webster, 2022). Pretrial detention, lengthy legal procedures, and significant financial costs can serve as the “primary punishment” for defendants (Feeley, 1992: 199), with research showing how defendants can plead guilty to get out of jail or avoid the emotional and financial burdens of going to trial (Blume and Helm, 2014; Cheng, 2013; Euvrard and Leclerc, 2017; Kellough and Wortley, 2002; Leclerc and Euvrard, 2019). These pressures are exacerbated by continuing constraints on legal aid services, further reflecting the managerial focus on efficiency and cost-cutting, with reduced funding to legal aid services leaving many defendants to navigate the complex legal processes alone (Flynn and Freiberg, 2018b; Helm et al, 2022; MacFarlane and Stratton, 2016).…”

Criminal Justice Reform: A Transformative Agenda

“…First, as Chloé Leclerc and Elsa Euvrard note, the criminal justice system could decrease undue pressure on defendants by adopting a fixed plea-bargaining discount schedule -a scheme that exists in other jurisdictions. 295 According to this scheme, defendants would receive some fixed discount percentage for pleading guilty at the initial arraignment, and that fixed percentage would incrementally decrease at each later point in the criminal justice process (for example, after the bail hearing, at the judicial pretrial hearing, at the preliminary inquiry, and at trial). 296 Furthermore, prosecutors could be mandated to inform defendants of the applicable sentencing discount at each stage of proceedings.…”

“…295 According to this scheme, defendants would receive some fixed discount percentage for pleading guilty at the initial arraignment, and that fixed percentage would incrementally decrease at each later point in the criminal justice process (for example, after the bail hearing, at the judicial pretrial hearing, at the preliminary inquiry, and at trial). 296 Furthermore, prosecutors could be mandated to inform defendants of the applicable sentencing discount at each stage of proceedings. This approach would mitigate prosecutors' abilities to pressure defendants to plead guilty by leveraging their loss aversion and uncertainty.…”