This article examines why accused persons in pre-trial detention decide to plead guilty. Relying on the understanding of coercion proposed by Brunk, the article go beyond his analysis to show how pre-trial detention can exert pressure on an accused individual, who then feels coerced into pleading guilty. Interviews with 12 accused and 12 lawyers showed that in certain situations pre-trial detention can be a source of coercion, particularly if there are lengthy procedural delays and eventual sentences can be expected to be fairly short. However, there are other situations in which custodial remand acts as an inducement rather than as coercion or does not exert any pressure on the accused.

The empirical literature on plea decisions shows that rational motives and coercion may coexist, but there is uncertainty with regard to whether accused feel that their decision is voluntary or made under considerable pressure. However, in most jurisdictions, the legitimacy of the plea bargaining process rests on the Court’s obligation to ensure that the guilty plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly. This study proposes to understand how the accused interpret the rational or coercive elements of their decision-making process and the extent to which their decision to plead guilty is voluntary. Based on semi-structured interviews with twenty convicted individuals, we describe the different decision-making processes, from free and informed decisions to forced decisions to plead guilty while innocent.

Le présent article cherche à décrire et à comprendre les rapports de force entre les avocats de la défense et les procureurs de la Couronne lors des négociations des plaidoyers de culpabilité. S’appuyant sur la théorie de l’acteur stratégique (Crozier et Friedberg, 1977) et sur la manière dont le pouvoir et l’incertitude régulent les interactions, il s’intéresse à la manière dont certaines caractéristiques des causes criminelles sont utilisées par les avocats de la défense dans leurs rapports de force avec les procureurs lors de ces négociations. À la suite d’entrevues semi-dirigées menées auprès de douze avocats de la défense exerçant au palais de justice de Montréal, il est apparu que quatre éléments (la gravité et le type de crime, le nombre de chefs d’accusation, le temps écoulé depuis le début des procédures, la médiatisation d’une cause) pouvaient avoir des effets différents sur leurs rapports de force avec les procureurs de la Couronne. L’article met en évidence la manière dont les rapports de force peuvent varier selon certains éléments de la cause et comment ces éléments sont utilisés et perçus différemment par les avocats.This article aims to describe and understand the balance of power between criminal defence lawyers and public prosecutors during plea bargaining. Based on the strategic actor theory (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977), which proposes that power and uncertainty regulate the interactions, the article focuses on how several elements related to the criminal case are used by lawyers to shift the balance of power during those negotiations. Based on semi-structured interviews with twelve criminal defence lawyers working at the Montreal courthouse, it appears that four elements (class and type of offence, number of charges, time elapsed since the criminal justice process was started, media coverage) have different effects on the balance of power between lawyers and prosecutors. This article shows how the balance of power can shift depending on different elements related to the case and how these elements are used and perceived differently by lawyers.Este artículo busca describir y entender las relaciones de poder entre los abogados de la defensa y los procuradores de la Corona, durante las negociaciones de las declaraciones de culpabilidad. Apoyándose en la teoría del actor estratégico (Crozier y Friedberg, 1977) y en la manera en la que el poder y la incertidumbre regulan las interacciones, el artículo se interesa por la forma en la que ciertas características de las causas penales son utilizadas por los abogados de la defensa en sus relaciones de poder con los procuradores durante dichas negociaciones. Después de realizar entrevistas semi-directivas con doce abogados de la defensa, quienes ejercen en el Palacio de Justicia de Montreal, encontramos que cuatro elementos (la gravedad y el tipo de crimen, el número de cargos, el tiempo transcurrido desde el inicio del proceso, la mediatización de la causa), pueden tener efectos diferentes sobre sus relaciones de poder con los procuradores de la corona. ...

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