Plurilateral Trade Agreements: An Escape Route for the WTO?

Abstract

Due to the persistent stalemate in the WTO ’ s Doha Round negotiations, various smaller-scale options have drawn attention in recent years, including the negotiation of plurilateral agreements (PAs) among interested governments. There are essentially two types of such agreements, an exclusive and an open variant. While the former apply among the signatories only, the latter are implemented on a Most-favoured-Nation (MFN) basis. To preclude ‘ free riding ’ , the entry into force of such open PAs is usually conditioned on the participation of a ‘ critical mass ’ of countries, representing market shares of some 80% or more – quite a challenging benchmark. To promote more frequent use of PAs, given the plethora of pressing policy concerns, whether investment-, competition- or labour-related, the negotiation of exclusive agreements is being (re-)considered in current discussions. However, the entry into force of any non-MFN-based agreement would need to be accepted by consensus among all 160-odd WTO Members, and this may prove virtually impossible to achieve. This article thus proposes, based on past experience, to further explore the potential for open PAs among interested Members in the form of co-ordinated improvements of current commitments or, if not covered by the existing WTO framework, by way of ‘ WTOextra ’ understandings.

Equity‐efficiency tradeoffs in international bargaining

“…However, Proposition 1 suggests that even facially neutral expansions of the negotiation agenda (i.e., that don't appear to directly favor either side) have the potential to make at least one country worse-off and thus will be blocked. The policy implication is that, in order for Doha to make progress, serious consideration should be given to either relaxing the unanimity requirement (e.g., see Low, 2011) or relaxing the single undertaking principal and returning to an era of plurilateral arrangements (e.g., see Adlung & Mamdouh, 2018). 14 This section assumed the standard NBS as it is commonly used when modeling international trade agreements.…”

Developing Countries and Joint Statement Initiatives at the WTO: Damned if You Join, Damned if You Don't?

“…As a result of the requirement that members sign up to all elements of the Round, developing countries faced the choice of either accepting the codes -and other agreements they rejected -or losing the improved market access they had secured in the Uruguay Round, and potentially also their existing market access (Ostry, 2002). Ultimately, several of the Tokyo codes became universal rules for all members or were incorporated into Annex 4 of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement as plurilateral agreements (Adlung and Mamdouh, 2018). 3 As Adlung and Mamdouh (ibid.)…”

“…This means that every item under negotiation forms part of a single package of agreements, which prevents countries from picking and choosing individual agreements they wish to sign up to (Wolfe, 2009). These dynamics have resulted in a stalemate in multilateral trade negotiations and growing pessimism about the future of the WTO, with many arguing that reform is crucial for it to maintain its relevance (Adlung and Mamdouh, 2018; Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2015). Some have called for a power‐based system with weighted voting based on factors such as size of trade, GDP, population and market openness (Cottier and Takenoshita, 2008).…”

WTO plurilateral agreements: A multilateral approach in action

“…They argue that, given the potential reforms in the working procedures of the WTO, initiating "plurilateral initiatives involving major economic powers" is essential for maintaining an open, rules-based global economy. 14 Taking this consideration into account, we propose a single hypothesis.…”