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Due to the persistent stalemate in the WTO ’ s Doha Round negotiations, various smaller-scale options have drawn attention in recent years, including the negotiation of plurilateral agreements (PAs) among interested governments. There are essentially two types of such agreements, an exclusive and an open variant. While the former apply among the signatories only, the latter are implemented on a Most-favoured-Nation (MFN) basis. To preclude ‘ free riding ’ , the entry into force of such open PAs is usually conditioned on the participation of a ‘ critical mass ’ of countries, representing market shares of some 80% or more – quite a challenging benchmark. To promote more frequent use of PAs, given the plethora of pressing policy concerns, whether investment-, competition- or labour-related, the negotiation of exclusive agreements is being (re-)considered in current discussions. However, the entry into force of any non-MFN-based agreement would need to be accepted by consensus among all 160-odd WTO Members, and this may prove virtually impossible to achieve. This article thus proposes, based on past experience, to further explore the potential for open PAs among interested Members in the form of co-ordinated improvements of current commitments or, if not covered by the existing WTO framework, by way of ‘ WTOextra ’ understandings.

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There are essentially two types of plurilateral trade agreements (PAs) among WTO Members, an exclusive and an open variant. While the benefits of the former agreements are shared among participants only, the latter are implemented on an MFN-basis, thus profiting non-signatories as well. The most prominent examples are the Information Technology Agreement (1996) and the Fourth and Fifth Protocols under the GATS (1997) on telecom and financial services, respectively. To preclude 'free riding', their entry into force was made contingent on the participation of a 'critical mass' of countries. The respective benchmarks, usually market shares of some 80% or more, are quite challenging, however. To promote more widespread use of plurilaterals, given the plethora of pressing policy concerns, whether investment-, competition-or labour-related, and the persistent stalemate in the Doha Round negotiations, the conclusion of exclusive agreements is thus being (re-)considered in ongoing policy discussions. This article takes a sceptical view, since any such PA would need to be agreed by consensus among all 160-odd WTO Members. It may prove more rewarding to further explore the potential of open agreements to address policy concerns among interested Members either in the form of co-ordinated improvements of their current schedules or, if not covered by existing treaty frameworks, as ' WTO-extra' understandings.

This paper deals with claims, recently raised in various circles, that structural faults in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have prevented WTO Members from advancing services liberalization under the Agreement. The GATS is generally associated in this context with a bottom-up (positive-list) scheduling approach where the sectors on which trade commitments are undertaken are selected individually. This is claimed to be less efficient, in terms of liberalization effects, than alternative approaches under which everything is considered to be fully committed unless specifically excluded (top-down or negative listing). However, a closer look at services negotiations conducted in various settings, including the Doha-Round process, WTO accession cases and different types of regional trade agreements, suggests that such structural issues have limited, if any, impact on the results achieved. What ultimately matters are not negotiating or scheduling techniques, but the political impetus that the governments concerned are ready to generate.