Policy-Development Monopolies: Adverse Consequences and Institutional Responses

Hirsch, Alexander V.; Shotts, Kenneth W.

doi:10.1086/698930

Cited by 24 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…The incumbent can gain more from a somewhat misaligned agent willing to choose a stable policy than from a perfectly aligned agent who provides no insurance benefit. This result is in the spirit of Hirsch and Shotts (2018) who found that politicians want overseers with contrasting policy preferences to policy entrepreneurs. However, our model lets the politician pick the agent (i.e., policy entrepreneur) instead.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Delegation and political turnover

Sasso

2020

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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We study a two-period delegation model with an uncertain future principal. In the first period, an incumbent principal decides whether to delegate policy-making authority to an agent or make policy herself. Before the second period, there is an election, and another principal with different preferences may take power. The main result is that the incumbent can exploit the uncertainty about the future principal to extract policy surplus from the agent. The agent’s uncertainty about the future principal pushes him to implement a policy that both principals accept. The surplus from this compromise policy makes the incumbent better off than she would be without the possibility of turnover. We also find that when costs are low, policy stability can increase as elections become more competitive, as the agent has more incentive to implement a compromise policy. We then allow the incumbent to appoint the agent. We show that as the incumbent becomes more likely to retain office, she prefers more policy conflict with the agent.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Delegation and political turnover

Sasso

2020

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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“…10. This is akin to models of policy making with valence (e.g., Hirsch and Shotts 2012;2015), which have been employed to study, for example, interbranch bargaining (Londregan 2000), legislative policy making (Hitt, Volden, and Wiseman 2017), lobbying and special interest politics (Hirsch and Shotts 2018;Hübert and Rezaee n.d.), and bureaucratic expertise (Ting 2011;Turner 2017;2019a).…”

Section: A Model Of Unilateral Action With Bureaucracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism

Turner¹

2020

Pres Stud Q

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In this article, I argue that the need to motivate bureaucrats to invest in high‐quality policy implementation alters the appeal of executive unilateralism. If executive orders are less durable than legislation, then the bureaucracy will have weaker incentives to invest in policy making. This affects presidents’ willingness to compromise and work with Congress to pass legislation, rather than pursue unilateral action. Unilateralism becomes less attractive as bureaucratic capacity increases and as the relative durability of executive orders decreases. I formalize this logic in a simple formal model and discuss fruitful extensions for future work.

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“…Moreover, while some rival policy priorities are relatively well aligned and coordinated, others are not, in which case contradictory policies and agendas may be pursued simultaneously, even across the same institution. Levels of policy development (Hirsch and Schotts, 2017), policy coordination and integration (Mickwitz et al, 2009;Turnpenny et al, 2008) and policy implementation (Hampton, 2018;Schofield, 2001) vary enormously within and across institutions.…”

Section: Non-energy Policy Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Invisible energy policies: A new agenda for energy demand reduction

2018

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This article makes the case for a new and ambitious research and governance agenda for energy demand reduction. It argues that existing 'demand-side' approaches focused on promoting technological efficiency and informed individual consumption are unlikely to be adequate to achieving future carbon emissions reduction goals; it points out that very little attention has so far been paid to the impacts of non-energy policies on energy demand; and it submits that a much fuller integration of energy demand questions into policy is required. It advances a general framework, supported by illustrative examples, for understanding the impacts of 'non-energy' policies on energy demand. It reflects on why these connections have been so little explored and addressed within energy research and policy. And it argues that, for all their current 'invisibility', there is nonetheless scope for increasing the visibility of, and in effect 'mainstreaming', energy demand reduction objectives within other policy Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy (2018a) Smart meters: a guide.

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Policy-Development Monopolies: Adverse Consequences and Institutional Responses

Abstract: This online appendix contains all formal proofs, as well as analysis of an extension of a model with alternative assumptions about bargaining. We begin by establishing a general result on optimal policy development in our baseline model and our model of internal capacity.

Cited by 24 publications

References 50 publications

Delegation and political turnover

Delegation and political turnover

Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism

Invisible energy policies: A new agenda for energy demand reduction

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