Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism

Abstract

In this article, I argue that the need to motivate bureaucrats to invest in high‐quality policy implementation alters the appeal of executive unilateralism. If executive orders are less durable than legislation, then the bureaucracy will have weaker incentives to invest in policy making. This affects presidents’ willingness to compromise and work with Congress to pass legislation, rather than pursue unilateral action. Unilateralism becomes less attractive as bureaucratic capacity increases and as the relative durability of executive orders decreases. I formalize this logic in a simple formal model and discuss fruitful extensions for future work.

Bureaucratic autonomy and the policymaking capacity of United States agencies, 1998–2021

“…For studies of policymaking, the measures are a suitable independent variable. For example, Turner (2020) predicts that presidents have greater incentives to pursue legislation over unilateral action as capacity within the implementing agency increases. For studies of capacity building and investment, the measures are a suitable dependent variable.…”

“…The need for new measures of capacity is apparent in the literature. In recent years, theorists have formalized predictions about the effects of capacity on a variety of political phenomena (see Huber and Sanford, 2004; Ting, 2011; Turner, 2020). Moreover, the recent experience of the Trump Administration has raised questions about what strategies presidents use to build and deplete capacity within the civil-service workforce (see Benn, 2019; Bednar and Lewis, 2023).…”

Presidential directives in a resistant bureaucracy

“…22 Conclusion I motivated this paper with a question about whether presidents have the power to direct subordinates in the bureaucracy to enact policy changes. One reason this question has been difficult to answer is that presidents generally tend to only issue directives when the conditions necessary for implementation are favourable (Turner 2020), such as when there is sufficient policy coordination within the bureaucracy (Krause and Dupay 2009;Rudalevige 2012), or when an agency is already working on a policy that aligns with a president's goals (Kagan 2001(Kagan , p.2299. All of this suggests that the issuance of a directive may not tell us anything about the scope of a president's real authority over policy change.…”

“…1 Although exercising such power may seem trivial for a president who is operating within acceptable legal bounds, there are other obstacles that can stand in the way. It is not just that bureaucrats can have policy goals that differ from the president's goals, but also that bureaucrats are: (i) better informed about how to develop and implement policy change (Gailmard and Patty 2012;Lowande 2018;Turner 2020); (ii) numerous to the point of vastly outnumbering the president's political staff; (iii) prolific policymakers that are generally able to execute more decisions than the president's staff can reasonably monitor (Acs 2018;Potter 2019) and (iv) largely protected from removal by the president. Given these obstacles, how effective can a president's directive be?…”

Reversals of Capacity: Norms, Culture, and Institutional Disruption

“…Should an agency become acutely politicized, the mass departure of high-skilled bureaucrats motivated by an agency's institutional mission may occur. This singular outcome would erode a nation's bureaucratic capacity, which the literature defines in general terms as the overall quality of the public sector Ting 2011;Turner 2020). As a result, there may occur long-term damage to the quality of the agency's output that carries the potential to permanently harm state capacity.…”