Presidential directives in a resistant bureaucracy

Abstract

Presidential directives are often assumed to be checked only by external actors, like Congress and the courts. But the internal constraints facing presidents can also be substantial. I study a model where a president can induce compliance with a directive by removing some subordinate agents (the appointees) but not others (the careerists), and where the relative contribution of each agent to the directive’s success is unobservable. The model suggests that the formal authority presidents have to issue directives and remove subordinates can advance presidential goals, affording presidents real authority. But real authority is not guaranteed, and the resulting uncertainty can shape presidential decision-making: when to issue a directive, how ambitious to make it, and which agencies to target. To illustrate, I analyse two prominent directives in Clinton’s regulatory planning order, E.O. 12866, showing why they targeted different agencies, despite belonging to the same order, and why compliance has been uneven.

Under Pressure: Centralizing Regulation in Response to Presidential Priorities

“…An executive agency is a “they,” not an “it” (e.g., Magill and Vermeule 2011; Rudalevige 2012; Sunstein and Vermeule 2014). Therefore, an important part of presidential control involves consideration of the organizational complexities of administrative behavior, as presidential control efforts tend to influence the interactions of administrators within the executive branch in meaningful ways (Acs 2020; Krause 2009; Resh 2015). Put another way, the exercise of formal directive authority cannot, by itself, overcome the management and coordination dilemmas inherent in the administrative process.…”

“…For example, President Obama's managerial strategy did not rely solely on presidential directives, but on a wider range of tools to exert influence over the bureaucracy (Rudalevige 2016). Often these tools establish a route for administrative policymaking that directs decisions into the hands of political appointees (Acs 2020; Rudalevige 2012).…”

Who Controls the Immigration Bureaucracy? The Relative Influence of the Three Branches Over Asylum Policy Implementation

“…Whether the bureaucracy’s constitutional principals (Congress, the president, and the courts) can effectively control the vast administrative state remains a question of intense interest to scholars (e.g. Acs, 2018, 2021; Calvert et al, 1989; Lowande, 2018; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Posner & Vermeule, 2010; Potter, 2019). We shed light on this question by focusing on a policy that is certainly fraught with political considerations: immigration.…”