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Supreme Court influence depends greatly on the responses of lower court judges to its precedent. Justices employ numerous strategies to obtain lower court deference to their decisions, including the provocative practice of relying upon foreign law. Referred to as “constitutional cross-fertilization” when used in constitutional interpretation, this practice is labeled by critics as a threat to American democracy. Research suggests that the Court uses such references strategically to prop up controversial and ideologically charged decisions, and that they obtain a benefit in the form of increased citations. These studies do not tell us if the Court gains lower court deference. I contend that, in constitutional cases, lower court judges will not find reliance upon such sources persuasive; rather, they will regard these references with disdain. My findings support my argument. Contrary to the justices’ intentions, reliance upon foreign law in constitutional cases is associated with an increased probability of negative, as opposed to positive, treatment. Justices incur significant costs from participating in the global rights dialogue.

Policies concerning undocumented immigrants are inevitably ambivalent, creating uncertainty and confusion in the implementation process. We identify a clear example of this ambivalence —U.S. law setting standards for determining the credibility of asylum seekers—that resulted in an increase in asylum grants despite policymakers' intention to make it harder for individuals to obtain the status. We argue that this law, The REAL ID Act of 2005, sent mixed messages to immigration judges (IJs), street‐level bureaucrats who implement immigration policy. It increased IJ discretion, but set vague limits. We theorize that IJs, behaving in a bounded rationality framework, use their professional legal training as a short‐cut and look primarily to the courts for guidance. Our evidence supports our argument. After the passage of the REAL ID Act, IJ decision‐making is more closely aligned with the preferences of their political and legal principals, and, in the final score, the federal circuit courts are the winners.

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At the center of contentious debates concerning U.S. asylum policy are immigration judges, bureaucrats who decide life and death cases on a daily basis. Congress, the executive and the courts compete for influence over these key actors — administrative judges distinct from those examined in much of the bureaucratic control literature. They are hired, fired, promoted or demoted by executive officials; face congressional oversight; and must follow circuit law. We argue that, because of the fear of reversal, immigration judges will look most to the courts in the decision-making process. Our results support our theory. Examining over 900,000 immigration judges’ decisions, we find that, although IJs are influenced by a fear of pushback from the elected branches, the impact is conditional on circuit preferences. Our findings inform scholarly understanding of judicial behavior and bureaucratic accountability, and support the pursuit of judicial independence and due process in immigration courts.