Power of the Pen or the Gavel? Determining Asylum Standards on the Courts of Appeals

Stobb, Maureen

doi:10.1080/0098261x.2019.1645629

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…12 We anticipate that Ninth Circuit cases will be more likely to receive pro-immigrant outcomes than cases heard in other circuits. To account for the potential hierarchical constraining effect present within circuit courts, where a panel of judges may be cognizant of their fellow circuit judges’ preferences when deciding the case before them (Haire, Lindquist, and Songer 2003; Stobb 2019), we control for the Circuit Median Ideology (measured following the ideology measurement outlined above) for the active circuit judges during the year of the case’s decision. To help proxy for inter-circuit immigration law workload differences, we also include the variable Proportion Immigration Cases .…”

Section: Data and Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Prior work has helped us learn about immigration court decisions in in absentia matters (e.g., Eagly and Shafer 2020;Gomez 1993) and other immigration cases (Asad 2019;Shafer 2015, 2020;Hamlin 2014;Keith, Holmes, and Miller 2013;Kim and Semet 2020;Holmes 2015a, 2015b;Palmer, Yale-Loehr, and Cronin 2005;Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag 2007), detailing with powerful empirical evidence the disparities faced by immigrants within the court system. Far outside of the in absentia context, previous research has tackled decision making in the federal courts of appeals in other immigration matters (Gill, Kagan, and Marouf 2019;Hamlin 2014;Law 2010;Law 2005;Palmer, Yale-Loehr, and Cronin 2005;Stobb 2019;Westerland 2009;Williams and Law 2012) and beyond. However, much remains empirically unknown when it comes to federal court judicial review of in absentia orders and, more broadly, judicial behavior when unambiguous law and politics are in tension with one another.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Congressional Constraint? The Review of In Absentia Immigration Removal Orders in Federal Circuit Courts

Boyd

Carlos

Taylor

et al. 2023

Political Research Quarterly

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Within the politically charged immigration system in the United States, Congress mandates the entry of in absentia removal orders against immigrants who fail to appear for immigration court hearings. Statutory guidance similarly constrains the ability of appellate courts to overturn those in absentia orders. In this article, we examine how federal circuit court judges make decisions in the review of in absentia orders when faced with discretion-revoking congressional statutory language pitted against a highly politicized area of law where policy preferences sit at the forefront of judges’ minds. Using an original dataset of U.S. Courts of Appeals cases decided from 2001 to 2020, we find that pro-immigrant decisions are rare, as intended by the governing statute. We also find, however, that judicial policy preferences predict the degree to which federal judges support the petitioning immigrant through statutory factors related to the adequacy of government notice and the presence of exceptional circumstances to justify nonappearance.

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Section: Data and Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Congressional Constraint? The Review of In Absentia Immigration Removal Orders in Federal Circuit Courts

Boyd

Carlos

Taylor

et al. 2023

Political Research Quarterly

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“…REAL ID does not include an explicit reasonableness requirement. 4 In ideological terms, the heart of the claim rule is best categorized as a liberal standard because, by narrowing the permissible bases for an adverse credibility determination, it increases the probability that an immigration judge will find an asylum applicant credible and therefore grant asylum (Stobb, 2019). For issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, and privacy, a liberal outcome is pro-underdog, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (Segal & Spaeth, 1993, p. 243).…”

Section: Altering the Credibility Landscapementioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed messages & bounded rationality: The perverse consequences of realIDfor immigration policy

Stobb

Miller

Kennedy

2022

Policy Studies Journal

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Policies concerning undocumented immigrants are inevitably ambivalent, creating uncertainty and confusion in the implementation process. We identify a clear example of this ambivalence —U.S. law setting standards for determining the credibility of asylum seekers—that resulted in an increase in asylum grants despite policymakers' intention to make it harder for individuals to obtain the status. We argue that this law, The REAL ID Act of 2005, sent mixed messages to immigration judges (IJs), street‐level bureaucrats who implement immigration policy. It increased IJ discretion, but set vague limits. We theorize that IJs, behaving in a bounded rationality framework, use their professional legal training as a short‐cut and look primarily to the courts for guidance. Our evidence supports our argument. After the passage of the REAL ID Act, IJ decision‐making is more closely aligned with the preferences of their political and legal principals, and, in the final score, the federal circuit courts are the winners.

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“…Studies demonstrate that circuit court ideology influences their decision-making in administrative appeals in general, and in immigration cases in particular (Humphries and Songer 1999; Westerland, 2009; Williams & Law, 2010, Taratoot & Howard, 2011). 14 Federal court of appeals judges vary in their reaction to statutory changes, with some resisting congressional directives (See Stobb, 2019, citing, for example, Doumbia v. Attorney General of the U.S., 2011; Hassan v. Holder, 2009; Shrestha v. Holder, 2010). Stobb (2019) finds that circuit ideology is a critical variable determining circuit responses to such changes in the law.…”

Section: Serving Three Mastersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…14 Federal court of appeals judges vary in their reaction to statutory changes, with some resisting congressional directives (See Stobb, 2019, citing, for example, Doumbia v. Attorney General of the U.S., 2011; Hassan v. Holder, 2009; Shrestha v. Holder, 2010). Stobb (2019) finds that circuit ideology is a critical variable determining circuit responses to such changes in the law.…”

Section: Serving Three Mastersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Controls the Immigration Bureaucracy? The Relative Influence of the Three Branches Over Asylum Policy Implementation

Stobb

Miller

Kennedy

2022

American Politics Research

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At the center of contentious debates concerning U.S. asylum policy are immigration judges, bureaucrats who decide life and death cases on a daily basis. Congress, the executive and the courts compete for influence over these key actors — administrative judges distinct from those examined in much of the bureaucratic control literature. They are hired, fired, promoted or demoted by executive officials; face congressional oversight; and must follow circuit law. We argue that, because of the fear of reversal, immigration judges will look most to the courts in the decision-making process. Our results support our theory. Examining over 900,000 immigration judges’ decisions, we find that, although IJs are influenced by a fear of pushback from the elected branches, the impact is conditional on circuit preferences. Our findings inform scholarly understanding of judicial behavior and bureaucratic accountability, and support the pursuit of judicial independence and due process in immigration courts.

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Power of the Pen or the Gavel? Determining Asylum Standards on the Courts of Appeals

Cited by 3 publications

References 32 publications

Congressional Constraint? The Review of In Absentia Immigration Removal Orders in Federal Circuit Courts

Congressional Constraint? The Review of In Absentia Immigration Removal Orders in Federal Circuit Courts

Mixed messages & bounded rationality: The perverse consequences of realIDfor immigration policy

Who Controls the Immigration Bureaucracy? The Relative Influence of the Three Branches Over Asylum Policy Implementation

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