Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

Conconi, Paola; Facchini, Giovanni; Zanardi, Maurizio

doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.06.006

Cited by 61 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Conconi et al (2014) investigate the role of re-election considerations. They …nd that the trade policy voting behavior of US Senators is more protectionist during the last 2-year cycle of their mandate, unless they face zero or very low re-election risk as a result of already announcing their retirement or being entrenched in a "safe seat".…”

Section: Prior Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade

Lake

Millimet

2016

Journal of International Economics

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Even if free trade creates net welfare gains for a country as a whole, the associated distributional implications can undermine the political viability of free trade. We show that trade-related redistributionas presently constituted -modestly increases the political viability of free trade in the US. We do so by assessing the causal e¤ect of expected redistribution associated with the US Trade Adjustment Assistance program on US Congressional voting behavior on eleven Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between 2003 and 2011. We …nd that a one standard deviation increase in expected redistribution leads to an average increase in the probability of voting in favor of an FTA of 1.8 percentage points. Although this is a modest impact on average, we …nd signi…cant heterogeneities; in particular, the e¤ect is larger when a representative's constituents are more at risk or the representative faces greater re-election risk.JEL: F13, H50, J65

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Section: Prior Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In such cases, expected redistribution may be more in ‡uential as it is necessary to squelch constituent unrest. Indeed, recent empirical evidence by Conconi et al (2014) suggests a strong role for re-election motives in determining Congressional voting behavior on US trade policy.…”

Section: Heterogeneity By Political Capitalmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade

Lake

Millimet

2016

Journal of International Economics

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“…Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi, 2014;Bouton, Conconi, Pino, and Zanardi, 2014;Conconi, Pino, and Zanardi, 2015). Our theoretical model builds on the sequential reciprocity framework developed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).…”

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confidence: 99%

Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Conconi

DeRemer

Kirchsteiger

et al. 2017

Journal of International Economics

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This paper shows that electoral incentives affect the occurrence of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2012 period, we show that U.S.presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election date.Moreover, disputes filed by the U.S. tend to target industries that are important to swing states in the presidential election. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which an incumbent can file a trade dispute to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. The incumbent's ability to initiate a dispute during the re-election campaign provides an advantage over the challenger, who cannot commit to file the dispute if elected. If voters' ideological preferences are not too strong in favor of either candidate, the incumbent will file a trade dispute to increase his re-election chances. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which an incumbent can file a trade dispute to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity. The incumbent's ability to initiate a dispute during the re-election campaign provides an advantage over the challenger, who cannot commit to file the dispute if elected. If voters' ideological preferences are not too strong in favor of either candidate, the incumbent will file a trade dispute to increase his re-election chances.JEL classifications: F13, D72, D78, D63.

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“…Recent contributions include Washington (2008), who investigates the effect of parenting daughters on the likelihood that House members will vote for reproductive rights, and Mian et al (2010), who examine legislators' votes on two bills introduced in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. Closest to our analysis is the paper by Conconi et al (2014a), which exploits inter-cameral differences in term length and the staggered structure of the Senate to show that electoral incentives deter legislators from supporting trade liberalization reforms.…”

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confidence: 99%

Guns and Votes

Bouton

Conconi

Pino

et al. 2014

Self Cite

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Why are U.S. congressmen reluctant to support gun control regulations, despite the fact that most Americans are in favor of them? We argue that re-election motives can lead politicians to take a pro-gun stance against the interests of an apathetic majority of the electorate, but in line with the interests of an intense minority. We develop a model of gun control choices in which incumbent politicians are both office and policy motivated, and voters differ in the direction and intensity of their preferences. We derive conditions under which politicians support gun control early in their terms, but oppose them when they approach re-election. We test the predictions of the model by analyzing votes on gun-related legislation in the U.S. Senate, in which one third of the members are up for re-election every two years. We find that senators are more likely to vote pro gun when they are close to facing re-election, a result which holds comparing both across and within legislators. Only Democratic senators "flip flop'' on gun control, and only if the group of pro-gun voters in their constituency is of intermediate size.

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Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections

Cited by 61 publications

References 52 publications

An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade

An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade

Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Guns and Votes

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