2006
DOI: 10.1177/1532673x04271905
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Political Appointees and the Competence of Federal Program Management

Abstract: In this article, we use the Bush administration's management grades to analyze whether programs administered by senior executives are better managed than those administered by political appointees requiring Senate confirmation. We explain the administration's management grading scheme and how it can be informative for evaluating comparative management quality. We explain why senior-executive-run programs should be better managed than appointee-run programs and test our claim with data on 234 federal programs. … Show more

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Cited by 75 publications
(52 citation statements)
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“…Although OMB examiners have raised questions about program effectiveness for many years, PART presents a very explicit, systematic, and transparent process for analyzing programs across the federal government. Observers of the federal government have begun to use PART scores to assess management effectiveness, as well as to detect potential links with funding decisions (Gilmour & Lewis, 2003).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although OMB examiners have raised questions about program effectiveness for many years, PART presents a very explicit, systematic, and transparent process for analyzing programs across the federal government. Observers of the federal government have begun to use PART scores to assess management effectiveness, as well as to detect potential links with funding decisions (Gilmour & Lewis, 2003).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, programs typically favored by Democrats received systematically lower PART scores from the Republican controlled OMB (i.e. it was the Bush administration's OMB) when compared to programs typically favored by Republicans (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006b). In addition to political influence intruding on performance assessment, financial regulatory programs had to also worry about crafting performance measures that truly reflected the current state of the financial industry.…”
Section: The Part Processmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…This section presents an overview of the key contributions in this area. Perry and Miller (1991) Similarly, other studies have estimated differences in performance between those U.S. federal agencies whose executives are recruited politically and those who are selected based on a merit system (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006;Lewis, 2007 and2008;Miller, 2015). The performance gap between programs administered by appointees and careerists could be even more pronounced depending on the rationale of political appointments.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%