Political budget cycles in Indonesia at the district level

Sjahrir, Bambang Suharnoko; Kis‐Katos, Krisztina; Schulze, Günther G.

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.007

Cited by 99 publications

(109 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In the setting of a young, recently established democracy, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) report evidence of PBCs in Russia's regional elections identifying electoral effects on public spending, financed by deficit and federal transfer increases. Along the same lines, Sjahrir et al (2013) uncover evidence of opportunistic cycles in Indonesia's districts with electoral effects being present in direct elections and of a larger magnitude when the incumbent runs for reelection. Evidence on the presence of politically induced cycles at subnational level finances are not solely confined to the post WWII period.…”

mentioning

confidence: 74%

Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities

Chortareas

Logothetis

Papandreou

2016

European Journal of Political Economy

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This paper considers the presence of political budget cycles in Greece's municipalities. We construct a new dataset from primary sources and we find strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation through increased expenditures and excessive borrowing. We use a dynamic panel data approach producing evidence of opportunistic behavior in local government finances. Our results are robust in the face of a series of controls including mayors running for reelection, their political alignment with the central government, and prolonged terms. Moreover, the results are robust to the exclusion of small sized municipalities and to the restriction of the time range of our investigation to the post-Maastricht period. We also consider whether opportunistic policies influence incumbents' reelection prospects finding that increased expenditures and election year opportunistic excesses are electorally rewarding. Our findings provide a characterization of opportunistic public finances management in Greek municipalities where electorally motivated budgetary decisions appear impervious to the various municipal reform attempts.

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confidence: 74%

Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities

Chortareas

Logothetis

Papandreou

2016

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…On the optimal length of the electoral term, see also Chappell and Peel (1979), Ginsburgh and Michel (1983), Keech and Simon (1983), Baleiras and Santos (2000) and Ferris and Voia (2009). 18 Several other institutional variables that may exert an impact on the magnitude of PBCs have been studied: the quality of institutions by Shi and Svensson (2006), government transparency by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), corruption by Shi and Svensson (2006), globalization by Efthyvoulou (2011), social capital measured by the level of generalized trust by Kouvavas (2013), direct versus indirect elections by Sjahrir et al (2013) and the degree of decentralization (Vergne 2009;Shelton 2014). Among these miscellaneous issues, the special role of the media emerges.…”

Section: Taking Into Account the Institutional Context: Conditional Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus

Dubois

2016

Public Choice

173

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Abstract:The aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following Nordhaus's (1975) publication on political business cycles (PBCs). I first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground-breaking contribution saw the light of the day. I also present a simplified version of Nordhaus's model to highlight his key results. I detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth. I then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on political business cycles, the actual research agenda. Finally, Iderive some paths for future research.

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“…A further local electoral reform introduced direct elections in 2005, which elected district mayors by popular vote (Sjahrir et al, 2014). From the start of the democratization process, all old-regime mayors were first allowed to complete their full 5-year term, which resulted in a historically determined, idiosyncratic and asynchronous election cycle for local mayors throughout our period of analysis (Sjahrir et al, 2013). The institutional feature of non-coordinated elections makes it especially easy to identify differences in district-level outcomes that arise just before or directly after mayoral elections.…”

Section: Decentralizing Environmental Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The institutional feature of non-coordinated elections makes it especially easy to identify differences in district-level outcomes that arise just before or directly after mayoral elections. The idiosyncratic introduction of democratic elections has been previously linked not only to increased forest loss (Burgess et al, 2012), but also to excessive administrative expenditures from the district budgets (Sjahrir et al, 2013). Martinez-Bravo et al (2017) link the staggered democratization process to a consolidation of old political elites and persistently lower governance outcomes.…”

Section: Decentralizing Environmental Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Palm Oil and the Politics of Deforestation in Indonesia

2020

Self Cite

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. AbstractThis paper studies the interactions between political and economic incentives to foster forest conversion in Indonesian districts. Using a district-level panel data set from 2001 to 2016, we analyze variation in remotely sensed forest loss and forest fires as well as measures of land use licensing. We link these outcomes to economic incentives to expand oil palm cultivation areas as well as political incentives arising before idiosyncratically-timed local mayoral elections. Empirical results document substantial increases in deforestation and forest fires in the year prior to local elections. Additionally, oil palm plays a crucial role in driving deforestation dynamics. Variations in global market prices of palm oil are closely linked to deforestation in areas which are geo-climatically best suited for growing oil palm and they amplify the importance of the political cycle. We thus find clear evidence for economic and political incentives reinforcing each other as drivers of forest loss and land conversion for oil palm cultivation. JEL-Code: O13, Q15, Q56, P16

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Political budget cycles in Indonesia at the district level

Cited by 99 publications

References 8 publications

Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities

Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities

Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus

Palm Oil and the Politics of Deforestation in Indonesia

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