Political–Bureaucratic Accountability in the EU Commission: Modernising the Executive

Wille, Anchrit

doi:10.1080/01402382.2010.486137

Cited by 25 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…(Bovens 2007: 450) This conceptualization of accountability contains clear constitutive elements, which render it particularly suitable for empirical research by allowing the systematic mapping of accountability relation and pinpointing specifically where failures occur. It has been increasingly used in the EU literature (Benz et al 2007;Bovens et al 2010;Curtin 2005Curtin , 2007Curtin and Egeberg 2008;Papadopoulos 2007;Wille 2010) and is in line with similar conceptualizations by various authors (e.g., Day and Klein 1987;Lastra and Shams 2001;Mulgan 2003;Pollitt 2003;Romzek and Dubnick 1998;Scott 2000).…”

Section: Demarcating Accountabilitysupporting

confidence: 52%

European agencies and their boards: promises and pitfalls of accountability beyond design

Busuioc¹

2012

Journal of European Public Policy

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European agencies have become an established part of the European Union's architectural set up and are the most proliferating institutional entities at the EU level. However, as their relevance and prevalence in the EU institutional landscape has increased, so have concerns about the possibility for such bodies to escape scrutiny. This article investigates a central element of agency accountability: their accountability vis-à-vis the management boards. The main and most direct confines on the grant of authority to agencies and their directors are represented by the management boards. Given the formal powers exercised by European agencies, it is important to observe to what extent boards are successful in exercising their scrutinizing roles. Based on interviews with agency directors and board representatives, this contribution unravels how these accountability ties operate in practice and identifies recurring weaknesses that seriously impinge upon their effectiveness. The contribution offers a potential explanation for the observed failings and reflects on the repercussions of these findings for agency accountability.

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Section: Demarcating Accountabilitysupporting

confidence: 52%

European agencies and their boards: promises and pitfalls of accountability beyond design

Busuioc¹

2012

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…Although the Commission is officially a neutral institution (Wille 2010(Wille : 1098, research increasingly shows that it (partly) functions as a political actor in reality (e.g., Hartlapp et al 2014;Wille 2010Wille : 1100. Concerning evaluations specifically, the Commission has been shown to ignore results from impact assessments when this was required by negotiations with the European Parliament (EP) and the Council (Torriti 2010(Torriti : 1078 and to selectively use evidence from programme evaluations that legitimize its pre-existing views (Boswell 2008: 472).…”

Section: Political Explanations and The Commissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…' By answering this question, this article contributes to the ongoing debate about the Commission's nature. Originally, the Commission was perceived as a technocratic institution, aimed at impartial problem-solving (Wille 2010(Wille : 1098. Nowadays, the Commission is perceived as (also) a political actor that pursues its own preferences and acts strategically (Hartlapp et al 2014: 1;Wille 2010Wille : 1100.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Originally, the Commission was perceived as a technocratic institution, aimed at impartial problem-solving (Wille 2010(Wille : 1098. Nowadays, the Commission is perceived as (also) a political actor that pursues its own preferences and acts strategically (Hartlapp et al 2014: 1;Wille 2010Wille : 1100. This political perspective on the Commission can be linked to a political view on evaluation use (e.g., Contandriopoulos and Brousselle 2012: 63-4;Cousins and Leithwood 1986: 347;Johnson et al 2009: 379;Weiss 1993: 95-103).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The (non-)use of ex post legislative evaluations by the European Commission

Voorst

Zwaan

2018

Journal of European Public Policy

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The European Commission has repeatedly emphasized that the results of ex post legislative (EPL) evaluations should be used to improve the quality of its legislative proposals. This article aims to explain the variation in such instrumental use of EPL evaluations by the Commission. Three high-quality EPL evaluations with varying levels of use were studied in-depth to assess the influence of political factors on evaluation use. The results show that, contrary to expectations, EPL evaluations may be used instrumentally even if their recommendations are opposed by important political actors in the legislative process. This article also shows that a lack of salience of the policy field to which an EPL evaluation belongs in the eyes of the Commission could, in combination with the institution's ambition to reduce its legislative output, be a sufficient condition for the non-use of that evaluation.

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“…Conceptualizing the multi-level actor/forum relationships in the EU system, Bovens et al (2010), Brandsma and Schillemans (2012) and Wille (2010), respectively elaborate on the increasingly sophisticated European -accountability architecture‖ and on an -accountability framework for multi-level governance‖. Based on the Bovens (2007Bovens ( , 2010, analytical framework this contribution, firstly, sets out to map the accountability relations in which the HRVP and the EEAS stand, and secondly, discuss how the current (post-Lisbon) institutional arrangement ensures more (or less) accountability as compared to the pre-Lisbon situation.…”

Section: Analytical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict and Continuity in European Diplomatic Cultures: Accountability, Scrutiny and Control in EU External Affairs

Henökl¹

2016

IRD

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University of Agder (UiA), Kristiansand, Norway Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs (HRVP) has obtained far-reaching powers to formulate, coordinate and implement É U external policies, traditionally a prerogative of the state. In the exercise of this delegated powers, the HRVP is assisted by a dedicated administrative body, the European External Action Service (EEAS). Formal decision-making over the EU's common foreign and security policy lies with the Council, while the European Neighborhood and Trade policies, as well as international cooperation remain competences of the EU-Commission. Concomitantly, the EEAS is situated within several, partly overlapping and conflicting accountability relationships. The ensuing question is: To what extent, how and by whom can the HRVP and the EEAS be held politically to account? With data from official documents, 50 semi-structured interviews and a survey among 184 EU foreign policy-makers, the article maps and assesses of the multi-level actor/forum relationships of the EU's foreign policy machinery.

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Political–Bureaucratic Accountability in the EU Commission: Modernising the Executive

Cited by 25 publications

References 34 publications

European agencies and their boards: promises and pitfalls of accountability beyond design

European agencies and their boards: promises and pitfalls of accountability beyond design

The (non-)use of ex post legislative evaluations by the European Commission

Conflict and Continuity in European Diplomatic Cultures: Accountability, Scrutiny and Control in EU External Affairs

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