Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry

Key, Kimberly G.

doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(97)00012-8

Cited by 195 publications

(113 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Existing literature demonstrates that executives engage in earnings manipulation both upward and downward management through accruals for a number of incentives, e.g., to maximize their compensation, to avoid debt-covenant violation, to meet and beat earnings benchmarks, and to reduce political visibility (e.g., [13]- [16]). …”

Section: B Earnings Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Measurements of Budgetary Slack: The Empirical Evidence of Listed Companies in Thailand

Damrongsukniwat¹,

Kunpanitchakit²,

Durongwatana³

2015

JOEBM

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Abstract-This study introduces an objective measurement of budgetary slack based on ex post measure of firm's annual budget achievability with the exclusion of earnings management through discretionary accruals rather than the traditional subjective measurement based on management's perceptions. Also, this study empirically examines the association between budgetary slack and its determinants under various budgetary slack measurements. This study uses data from survey questionnaires and data from the annual financial statements for the year ended 2009 of listed non-financial and non-rehabilitation companies in Thailand. The population covers 387 firms and there are 38 returned and usable questionnaires which is 10% response rate. Although the objective measurement of budgetary slack is statistically found to be positively related to the traditional subjective measurement, the suggested objective measurement is considered to be a superior one. Moreover, the association between budgetary slack and its determinants is relatively sensitive to the measurements of budgetary slack.Index Terms-Budget achievability, budgetary slack, discretionary accruals, earnings management.

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Section: B Earnings Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Measurements of Budgetary Slack: The Empirical Evidence of Listed Companies in Thailand

Damrongsukniwat¹,

Kunpanitchakit²,

Durongwatana³

2015

JOEBM

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“…3 Contracting-based motives for earnings management that have been examined include executive current cash bonus maximization (Healy 1985), the avoidance of debt covenant violations (Defond and Jiambalvo 1994), more favorable equity and bond pricing (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998a and 1998b; Aharony, Wang and Yuan 2010; Higgins 2013), the reduction of debt renegotiation costs (Bohren and Haug 2006), political cost considerations (Key 1997;Patten and Trompeter 2003), and executive equity compensation (Cheng and Warfield 2005). 4 One exception is the study by Bowen, DuCharme and Shores (1995).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Career Concerns and Earnings Management

Demers

Wang

2013

SSRN Journal

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Motivated by the disconnect between survey evidence documenting that executives prioritize implicit contracting (i.e., labor market based career concerns) when making earnings management decisions (Graham et al (2005)) and the extant literature's focus on explicit contracting to explain earnings manipulation, we examine analytically the role of managerial career concerns in earnings management. Building on Holmstrom (1982Holmstrom ( , 1999, we present a career concerns based earnings management model that incorporates the unique reversing nature of earnings management. A key insight derived from the model is that whether the predictions of a traditional career concerns model prevail, which is to say that managers engage in more income-increasing behavior in their early years, critically depends upon the reversal characteristics of the earnings management vehicle chosen.JEL Classification: M40, M41.

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“…De acordo com Key (1997), na Teoria dos Custos Políticos, na medida em que uma empresa está sujeita a potencial de transferência de riqueza para partes interessadas (processo político), os agentes estarão propensos a fazer escolhas contábeis que reduzam essa transferên-cia. Trata-se de uma preocupação dos agentes com a visibilidade da firma perante os analistas, investidores institucionais, reguladores, do Fisco, dos concorrentes e outras partes interessadas (como os sindicatos por exemplo).…”

Section: Hipótese Dos Custos Políticosunclassified

“…Outra variável de controle avaliada foi o Crescimento dos Ativos (CrescAtivo) -sua utilização, assim como o ROA, se fundamenta na Hipótese dos Custos Políticos (Key, 1997). Primeiro que empresas com maiores taxas de crescimento estarão mais sujeitas a republicação (Young & Peng, 2012;Baber et al, 2015).…”

Section: Incentivos à Republicação Das Demonstraçõesunclassified

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Determinantes das Republicações no Mercado Brasileiro: Uma Análise a partir dos Incentivos ao Gerenciamento de Resultados

Marques

Amaral

Souza

et al. 2017

REPeC

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Political cost incentives for earnings management in the cable television industry

Cited by 195 publications

References 9 publications

The Measurements of Budgetary Slack: The Empirical Evidence of Listed Companies in Thailand

The Measurements of Budgetary Slack: The Empirical Evidence of Listed Companies in Thailand

Career Concerns and Earnings Management

Determinantes das Republicações no Mercado Brasileiro: Uma Análise a partir dos Incentivos ao Gerenciamento de Resultados

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