Political machinery: did robots swing the 2016 US presidential election?

Frey, Carl Benedikt; Berger, Thor; Chen, Chinchih

doi:10.1093/oxrep/gry007

Cited by 125 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 40 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Notes 1. https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cover-story/cover -story-2017-10-23 2. On the "losers" of change, see Im et al (2018), Kurer (2018), Kurer and Gallego (2018), Frey, Berger and Chen (2017); on the "winners," on new voting cleavages, e.g., Gingrich and Hausermann (2015). 3.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Did State Responses to Automation Matter for Voters?

Gingrich

2019

Research & Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper asks whether early responses to de-industrialization and automation shaped how those affected negatively by technological change responded politically. It begins by examining patterns of compensation, outlining cross-national differences in the use of passive early retirement benefits, the expansion of public services, and regulation of the labor market. It then pools 20 waves of the International Social Survey Programme, and examines party choices across groups of workers. It finds that those exposed to technological change are both more likely to vote for the mainstream left and right populists. Differences in compensation have a limited direct or indirect effect. Where spending and labor market regulation does matter, it heightens both left and right-populist voting among affected groups.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Did State Responses to Automation Matter for Voters?

Gingrich

2019

Research & Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Evidence in the same direction has been found for the United States. Specifically, focusing on the 2016 US presidential election, Frey, Berger, and Chen (2018) find that higher exposure to robot adoption, at the regional level, led to higher support for Donald Trump, who was running on an economic nationalist political platform that has many points of contact with the European radical right.…”

Section: Technological Changementioning

confidence: 99%

The Surge of Economic Nationalism in Western Europe

Colantone

Stanig

2019

Journal of Economic Perspectives

135

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We document the surge of economic nationalist and radical-right parties in western Europe between the early 1990s and 2016. We discuss how economic shocks contribute to explaining this political shift, looking in turn at theory and evidence on the political effects of globalization, technological change, the financial and sovereign debt crises of 2008–2009 and 2011–2013, and immigration. The main message that emerges is that failures in addressing the distributional consequences of economic shocks are a key factor behind the success of nationalist and radical-right parties. We discuss how the economic explanations compete with and complement the “cultural backlash” view. We reflect on possible future political developments, which depend on the evolving intensities of economic shocks, on the strength and persistence of adjustment costs, and on changes on the supply side of politics.

show abstract

“…In some cases, these changes were followed by growing geographic disparities in economic activity and depopulation of rural areas. These shifts proved fertile ground for populist forces (Tomlinson 2017;Frey, Berger, and Chen 2018).…”

Section: Economic Change and Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered

Margalit

2019

Journal of Economic Perspectives

214

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Growing conventional wisdom holds that a chief driver of the populist vote is economic insecurity. I contend that this view overstates the role of economic insecurity as an explanation in several ways. First, it conflates the significance of economic insecurity in influencing the election outcome on the margin with its significance in explaining the overall populist vote. Empirical findings indicate that the share of populist support explained by economic insecurity is modest. Second, recent evidence indicates that voters’ concern with immigration—a key issue for many populist parties—is only marginally shaped by its real or perceived repercussions on their economic standing. Third, economics-centric accounts of populism treat voters’ cultural concerns as largely a byproduct of experiencing adverse economic change. This approach underplays the reverse process, whereby disaffection from social and cultural change drives both economic discontent and support for populism.

show abstract

Political machinery: did robots swing the 2016 US presidential election?

Cited by 125 publications

References 40 publications

Did State Responses to Automation Matter for Voters?

Did State Responses to Automation Matter for Voters?

The Surge of Economic Nationalism in Western Europe

Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About