The central political claim of Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism is that class actors, through the instruments of the democratic process, can modify capitalism. Where working-class mobilization is strong, left parties have sufficient electoral support in the political arena to alter markets politically in ways that decommodify and thereby empower workers. The decline of traditional class voting, however, has profoundly changed this dynamic of welfare politics. We show that the political support coalition for welfare states has been reconfigured through two processes. On the one hand, the Left may have lost support among the traditional working class, but it has substituted this decline by attracting substantial electoral support among specific parts of the expanding middle class. On the other hand, the welfare support coalition has been stabilized through increasing support for the welfare state among right-wing political parties. We discuss the possible consequences of this 'middle-class shift' in the welfare support coalition in terms of policy consequences.

Over the past three decades, market reforms have transformed public services such as education, health, and care of the elderly. Whereas previous studies present markets as having similar and largely non-political effects, this book shows that political parties structure markets in diverse ways to achieve distinct political aims. Left-wing attempts to sustain the legitimacy of the welfare state are compared with right-wing wishes to limit the state and empower the private sector. Examining a broad range of countries, time periods, and policy areas, Jane R. Gingrich helps readers make sense of the complexity of market reforms in the industrialized world. The use of innovative multi-case studies and in-depth interviews with senior European policymakers enriches the debate and brings clarity to this multifaceted topic. Scholars and students working on the policymaking process in this central area will be interested in this new conceptualization of market reform.

This paper asks whether early responses to de-industrialization and automation shaped how those affected negatively by technological change responded politically. It begins by examining patterns of compensation, outlining cross-national differences in the use of passive early retirement benefits, the expansion of public services, and regulation of the labor market. It then pools 20 waves of the International Social Survey Programme, and examines party choices across groups of workers. It finds that those exposed to technological change are both more likely to vote for the mainstream left and right populists. Differences in compensation have a limited direct or indirect effect. Where spending and labor market regulation does matter, it heightens both left and right-populist voting among affected groups.

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