Political normativity and the functional autonomy of politics

Abstract

This article argues for a new interpretation of the realist claim that politics is autonomous from morality and involves specific political values. First, this article defends an original normative source: functional normativity. Second, it advocates a substantive functional standard: political institutions ought to be assessed by their capacity to select and implement collective decisions. Drawing from the ‘etiological account’ in philosophy of biology, I will argue that functions yield normative standards, which are independent from morality. For example, a ‘good heart’ is one that pumps blood well, and a good army is one that it is effective at exerting military force. I then interpret realism’s naturalistic conception of politics as an etiological function of social groups: namely making binding collective decisions under persistent disagreement. I conclude that political institutions should be evaluated realistically by how well they perform this task. Finally, I assess trade-offs between this functional political normativity and other moral values. I conclude that justice, fairness, freedom and equality remain obviously important concerns, but only once the basic political function is secured.

The political AI

“…AI guidelines just because they are normatively attractive will not be binding without being enforceable. As realists tend to say, it is politics that provides collectively binding -and legitimate -decisions (Burelli 2020).…”

Distinctively political normativity in political theory

“…While all theorists adopting the non-moral view in this debate call themselves political realists, what constitutes political realism as a "school of thought" does not immediately concern us here.5 Some theorists (e.g.,Burelli & Destri, 2021) explicitly endorse an instrumental approach to political normativity, while for others, instrumental normativity is in line with their central claims(Erman & Möller, 2021).6 Recently, a slightly different but yet structurally similar approach has been articulated in functional rather than instrumental terms (seeBurelli, 2020). This "functional" account shares with instrumental accounts the idea that there is an "end" or "goal" of politics-a "function"-and that this function gives rise to a political normativity that is independent of morality.The function itself, however, contrary to (subjective) instrumental norms, should on this account be understood as an objective standard, relying on naturalistic and causal factors that are independent of any intentions or desires of agents (a so-called etiological function;Burelli, 2020, pp.…”

“…6 6 Recently, a slightly different but yet structurally similar approach has been articulated in functional rather than instrumental terms (see Burelli, 2020). This “functional” account shares with instrumental accounts the idea that there is an “end” or “goal” of politics—a “function”—and that this function gives rise to a political normativity that is independent of morality.…”

“…This “functional” account shares with instrumental accounts the idea that there is an “end” or “goal” of politics—a “function”—and that this function gives rise to a political normativity that is independent of morality. The function itself, however, contrary to (subjective) instrumental norms, should on this account be understood as an objective standard, relying on naturalistic and causal factors that are independent of any intentions or desires of agents (a so‐called etiological function; Burelli, 2020, pp. 6–10).…”

Editorial ‘Political Normativity. Critical Essays on the Autonomy of the Political’

“…One option is to argue that political normativity can be grounded in the realist conception of politics (Burelli 2021). For example, Williams (2005) claims that political normativity ought to be found in values "internal" to politics, which is therefore regulated by its own standards (Cozzaglio 2022;Burelli 2020). A prominent example of such a method can be envisaged in the realist elaboration of the concept of legitimacy, which realists claim must be prior to justice (Rossi and Sleat 2014;Sleat 2015) and be designed in a bottom-up way, yet without losing its critical power (Favara 2022;Cozzaglio 2021).…”