Political reactions to the euro crisis: cross-national variations and rescaling issues in elections and popular protests

Abstract

In this paper, we explore the different political responses to the euro crisis among European publics since the financial crisis in Europe started in 2008 by concentrating on the two most important organizational vehicles in a democratic polity: political parties and social movements. We examine the political geography of possible shifts in support patterns for competing parties at national elections (in the member states where they have been held) and the geographical distribution of popular protests related to the crisis in 2011-2012. Finally, we address the risks of democratic deterioration by comparing current developments with the interwar period.

Crisis Politics in Europe

“…Moreover, most of the Eurozone crisis countries have on average had much more centrist governments than those Eastern European countries that adjusted internally. Because implementing austerity policies is more difficult for these governments, especially in a Vulnerability Profile II context, it is not surprising that the euro crisis has been associated with political upheavals in these countries: In the course of the crisis, incumbents have been punished electorally, support for radical parties has increased and protest politics have become more prevalent in the wake of crisis (e.g., Bosco & Verney, 2012; van Gent, Mamadouh, & van der Wusten, 2013). Classifying Ireland and Cyprus as Profile III countries can also help explain why crisis politics have been much less difficult in these countries, although they have been more contentious than in the Eastern European countries with a similar vulnerability profile.…”

‘Our patience has run out’:*tracking the anti-government protest cycle in Bulgaria

“…The protests in Bulgaria over the 2012-2014 period represent an important development in the country's post-communist story. Their intensity echoed earlier protests against state failings in 1997 (Ganev, 1997) and also sat within a wider regional wave of actions challenging governance (see Musić, 2013;Beissinger and Sasse, 2014;van Gent et al, 2013). Previous work on the Bulgarian protests has emphasised the apparently spontaneous and less organised form, resulting from a sense of frustration, with Ambareva (2013) tracing a shift from the antineoliberal protests in early 2013 to the protests against the immorality of politics starting in June.…”

‘I know what is best for you better than you do’: cross-cultural evidence of the association between Monopoly on Truth and extremism (‘Yo sé mejor que tú lo que es mejor para ti’: evidencia transcultural de la asociación entre el monopolio de la verdad y el extremismo)

“…Conflictos socioeconómicos similares han demostrado ser factores clave para encender la llama del extremismo en el pasado, como se observó en la Gran Depresión a comienzos del siglo xx, que causó el auge de una multitud de movimientos extremistas y sus consecuencias sociales y políticas: polarización política, exilio y violencia (Hogg et al, 2013). Las investigaciones realizadas por van Gent, Mahmadouh y van der Wusten (Gent et al, 2013) confirmaron que la crisis económica de 2008 provocó que se reprodujera ese patrón, una situación que solo podemos esperar que se agrave después de la devastación global causada por la COVID-19. Por lo tanto, después de un periodo relativamente largo en el que el extremismo había declinado, podemos observar que ha comenzado a ganar fuerza otra vez (J. M. Sabucedo et al, 2020).…”

“…Similar socioeconomic troubles have proven key in igniting the flame of extremism before, as was observed with the Great Depression in the beginning of the twentieth century, which caused the heyday of a multitude of extremist movements and their social and political consequences: political polarization, exile and violence (Hogg et al, 2013). Research by van Gent, Mahmadouh and van der Wusten (Gent et al, 2013) confirmed that the economic crisis of 2008 caused this pattern to replicate, a situation that we can only expect to worsen after the global devastation caused by Covid-19. Hence, after a relatively long time period in which extremism had waned, we can observe how it has begun to gain traction once more (J. M. Sabucedo et al, 2020).…”