Political Responsiveness and Equity in Public Education Finance

Abstract

This study explores how politics affects the propensity of the American states to pursue equity in local outcomes. Using state education finance as an object of analysis, we develop a theoretical model that emphasizes the social welfare implications of equity versus allocative efficiency and distributive politics. We then hypothesize that the relative liberalism of a state's citizens and institutions should affect the weight attached to equity in the social welfare function, as well as the ability of the courts to alter those weights. Using a panel design, we explain state funding allocations to 8,048 local school districts from 1992 through 1996. The statistical results show that the relative emphasis on equity differs substantially across states based on political values. States with conservative citizens and institutions place less emphasis on revenue equity than states with liberal citizens and institutions. Judicial mandates are generally unsuccessful in producing more equal allocations, but are more successful when accompanied by receptive citizens and institutions. The larger implication is that responsiveness to political values is a major determinant of state propensity toward equalizing outcomes across local jurisdictions. POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS AND EQUITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCEEquity is a core value of democracy and widely studied in American politics. In this study we explore the general question of how politics affects the propensity of the American states to pursue equity in local outcomes? Within the American states substantial funding inequities exist across local school districts, and many argue that this results in disparate treatment of taxpayers, as well as differences in the quality of education. Thus, we use public education finance as an object of analysis to address the more general question.Public education finance is decentralized in most states with heavy reliance on local revenues.Local taxing authorities differ in their ability and willingness to raise revenues for education. Wealthy districts can raise greater revenues and provide a richer educational experience for their students. Poor districts often have lower revenues, even with higher tax effort, resulting in crumbling infrastructures, underpaid teachers, and an inability to educate students with special needs.In the interest of greater equity, all states supplement local funding through general revenues to "level-out" per pupil revenues. However, states are also often limited in their willingness to equalize funding across local districts, perhaps due to political considerations. For example, in 1996 total revenues per pupil across states ranged from $4,946 in Utah to $9,907 in New Jersey. Within Utah, revenues per pupil ranged from about $3,850 to $7,770, while in New Jersey they ranged from about $6,430 to $15,260. The Congressional Research Service has noted that disparities within states are often three to one from lowest to highest revenue districts (Riddle 1990). These revenue inequities result from alloca...

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