Our understanding of representation by government employees has increased considerably in the past 30 years. Scholars have found that represented groups benefit from representative bureaucracies and conclude that this benefit is a function of active representation. However, due to the aggregate unit of observation used in most of these studies and the outcome measures that are typically used as dependent variables, we argue that there are other forms of representation that can explain these finding. We contribute to the existing research in this area by focusing on symbolic representation and conduct our test using individual-level data from a national police-citizen contact survey. We hypothesize that citizen perceptions of legitimacy regarding police actions are shaped by the interaction of citizen race and officer race. Our results suggest that symbolic representation does occurblacks are more likely to perceive police actions as being legitimate if there are black officers present. Additionally, whites are more likely to perceive police actions as legitimate if the actions were conducted by white officers.

Despite the massive scale of state-level budgeting, there currently exists no theoretically grounded and empirically sound examination of budgetary tradeoffs at this level of government. In order to provide such an examination, we extend a well-accepted approach to tradeoffs at the federal level in order to accommodate the unique intergovernmental aspects of state-level budgeting. We develop expectations that need for a good, ideology of state-level decisionmakers, and the relative amounts of federal grants received in each expenditure category all influence tradeoff decisions. We test these hypotheses in an analysis of budgetary decisions in all 50 states between 1971 and 1996.

problem of multiple measures and to explore the different types of performance feedback that managers may receive from each. Purposes, Types, and Selection of Performance Measures in the LiteratureRecent work on performance measurement has moved beyond early assessments of the prevalence and benefi ts of performance measurement to investigate the many purposes that these measures can be used for and the diff erent types of measures that managers may choose from. Th is work is both taxonomic in nature, attempting to provide more nuance to our classifi cations of performance measurements, and prescriptive, off ering advice on how to choose the right measure.

This study explores how politics affects the propensity of the American states to pursue equity in local outcomes. Using state education finance as an object of analysis, we develop a theoretical model that emphasizes the social welfare implications of equity versus allocative efficiency and distributive politics. We then hypothesize that the relative liberalism of a state's citizens and institutions should affect the weight attached to equity in the social welfare function, as well as the ability of the courts to alter those weights. Using a panel design, we explain state funding allocations to 8,048 local school districts from 1992 through 1996. The statistical results show that the relative emphasis on equity differs substantially across states based on political values. States with conservative citizens and institutions place less emphasis on revenue equity than states with liberal citizens and institutions. Judicial mandates are generally unsuccessful in producing more equal allocations, but are more successful when accompanied by receptive citizens and institutions. The larger implication is that responsiveness to political values is a major determinant of state propensity toward equalizing outcomes across local jurisdictions. POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS AND EQUITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCEEquity is a core value of democracy and widely studied in American politics. In this study we explore the general question of how politics affects the propensity of the American states to pursue equity in local outcomes? Within the American states substantial funding inequities exist across local school districts, and many argue that this results in disparate treatment of taxpayers, as well as differences in the quality of education. Thus, we use public education finance as an object of analysis to address the more general question.Public education finance is decentralized in most states with heavy reliance on local revenues.Local taxing authorities differ in their ability and willingness to raise revenues for education. Wealthy districts can raise greater revenues and provide a richer educational experience for their students. Poor districts often have lower revenues, even with higher tax effort, resulting in crumbling infrastructures, underpaid teachers, and an inability to educate students with special needs.In the interest of greater equity, all states supplement local funding through general revenues to "level-out" per pupil revenues. However, states are also often limited in their willingness to equalize funding across local districts, perhaps due to political considerations. For example, in 1996 total revenues per pupil across states ranged from $4,946 in Utah to $9,907 in New Jersey. Within Utah, revenues per pupil ranged from about $3,850 to $7,770, while in New Jersey they ranged from about $6,430 to $15,260. The Congressional Research Service has noted that disparities within states are often three to one from lowest to highest revenue districts (Riddle 1990). These revenue inequities result from alloca...