Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions

Pastine, Ivan; Pastine, Tuvana

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9555-3

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Che and Gale (1997) consider a contest model where contestants face individual liquidity constraints but have symmetric prize valuations. Che and Gale (1998b), Gavious et al (2002) as well as Pastine and Pastine (2010b) analyze bidders with different prize valuations. However, their models are based on the assumption that contestants have a symmetric cap.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints

Grossmann

Dietl

2010

Public Choice

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints

Grossmann

Dietl

2010

Public Choice

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“…The application in their paper was lobbying. Pastine and Pastine (2010) study bid caps when the seller prefers to sell to one of the bidders (as can happen in the context of political lobbying). Without a bid cap, the equilibrium is given by [7.2].…”

Section: Bid Capsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advances in Auctions

Kaplan

Zamir

2015

Handbook of Game Theory With Economic Applications

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“…This only confirms the intuition that too large asymmetry in contests is, from revenue-maximization perspective, not desirable. For recent contributions, see also Pastine and Pastine (2010) and Grossman and Dietl (2011).…”

Section: Multiple Lobbiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Lobbying: A Review of the Recent Literature

Gregor

2011

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: This survey covers recent literature on lobbying, with particular focus on corporate lobbying. Three main research traditions ---contestsfor policy rent, persuasion games, and multiple means models ---are analyzed in detail. Various strategic aspects of lobbying arepresented in the context of a single unified model that encompasses both strategic communication and monetary contributions. Next, thereview investigates into three particular issues in the lobbying literature: (i) Incentive to lobby and the equilibrium amount of lobbying,both in the presence and absence of competitors, (ii) strategic substitution and complementarity of lobbying and contributions,and (iii) the role of intermediation in lobbying. Recent evidence from corporate lobbying is presented. Terms of use: Documents in

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Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions

Abstract: All-pay auction, Campaign finance reform, Explicit ceiling, D72, C72,

Cited by 14 publications

References 52 publications

Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints

Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints

Advances in Auctions

Corporate Lobbying: A Review of the Recent Literature

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