Advances in Auctions

Kaplan, Todd R.; Zamir, Shmuel

doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53766-9.00007-0

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 285 publications

(169 reference statements)

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“…The game theoretic analysis of the first price auction was initiated by the seminal paper of Vickrey (1961). Kaplan and Zamir (2015) provide a survey of the ever growing literature. Our main results hold for the unknown values case, where bidders do not necessarily know their own values.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann¹,

Brooks

Morris

2015

SSRN Journal

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We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions.For a given symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest winning bid distribution that can arise across all information structures and equilibria. The information and equilibrium attaining this minimum leave bidders uncertain whether they will win or lose and indifferent between their equilibrium bids and all higher bids. Our results provide lower bounds for bids and revenue with asymmetric distributions over values.We report further analytic and computational characterizations of revenue and bidder surplus including upper bounds on revenue. Our work has implications for the identification of value distributions from winning bid data and for the informationally robust comparison of alternative bidding mechanisms.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Bergemann¹,

Brooks

Morris

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…Most theoretical and experimental studies of sealed‐bid auctions assume simultaneous bidding (Kagel 1995; Kaplan and Zamir 2014). Nonetheless, in government procurement or when selling a privately owned company (such as an NBA franchise), the auctioneer may approach bidders separately, the auction may be open for an extended period of time, or bidding firms/groups go through a protracted procedure of authorizing the bid—which may imply a sequential timing of decisions (cf.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctions With Leaks About Early Bids: Analysis and Experimental Behavior

et al. 2020

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In sequential first‐ and second‐price private value auctions, second movers are informed about the first movers' bid with commonly known probability. Equilibrium bidding in first‐price auctions is mostly unaffected, but there are multiple equilibria in second‐price auctions affecting comparative statics across price rules. We show experimentally that informational leaks in first‐price auctions qualitatively confirm the theoretical predictions. In second‐price auctions, we analyze and experimentally confirm the existence of focal equilibria, and provide evidence for individual consistency in equilibrium selection. (JEL D44, C72, C91)

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Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security

Zheng

2019

Journal of Economic Theory

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Advances in Auctions

Cited by 7 publications

References 285 publications

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Auctions With Leaks About Early Bids: Analysis and Experimental Behavior

Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security

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