Politicisation and economic governance design

Abstract

The functional pressures shaping policy design may be disrupted in salient policies and politicised contexts, according to recent postfunctionalist/new intergovernmentalist theories. We contrast these expectations with those derived from liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism by analysing the reforms of the European Union economic governance. Its Council-centred enforcement, which has been a dominant feature until the euro crisis, despite noncompliance, does not sit comfortably with traditional theories but can be explained by policy salience and implementation uncertainties. Instead, the emphasis that traditional approaches assign to noncompliance, commitment problems, threats of exclusion and veto, issue linkages, path dependencies and supranational decision-making, allows to adequately account for the overall direction of reforms toward more tightening and delegation, notwithstanding the pooled enforcement in recent ancillary measures. Postfunctionalist theories overall fall short in highly politicised contexts, exactly where they should do most of the explaining. We conclude discussing politicization as a strategic elite response.

EU Actors under pressure: politicisation and depoliticisation as strategic responses

“…In doing so, the Commission assertively depoliticises contentious decisions. Finally, assessing reforms of the EU's economic governance, Franchino and Mariotto (2020) point to a shift in decision-arena, away from domestic and intergovernmental politics towards the (more technocratic and implementation-focused) supranational level. Importantly, these different contributions find more evidence of assertive than restrained depoliticisation.…”

“…The contributions look at supranational actors, like the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Commission (Blauberger & Martinsen, 2020;Moschella, Pinto, & Martocchia Diodati, 2020;Reh, Bressanelli, & Koop, 2020) as well as intergovernmental ones, like the Council of the EU (Hobolt & Wratil, 2020). Also, they zoom in on different decision-arenas, including law-making and inter-institutional relations (Bunea, 2020;Franchino & Mariotto, 2020), and explore a variety of governance challenges, including transparency and the rule of law (Hobolt & Wratil, 2020;Kelemen, 2020). Taking the EU's growing domestic relevance as analytical starting point, each contribution feeds into building an integrated actor-centred theoretical explanation of the conditions under which domestic pressures do (or do not) translate into EU-level responses.…”

The Implementation of Economic Rules: From the Stability and Growth Pact to the European Semester

“…On the contrary, in the second period, governments are more likely to implement the recommendations when they find themselves in severe economic distress, in light of Efstathiou and Wolff's (2019) findings, and when the recommended measures concern the SGP, instead of the MIP or the integrated guidelines on social, education, infrastructure, energy policies. Although the increasing mass politicization of negotiations on the economic governance in this latter period (Franchino and Mariotto, 2020; Kriesi and Grande, 2016; van der Veer, 2022), electoral accountability fails, surprisingly, to drive implementation. This role played by election‐minded politicians, perhaps interacting with government's ideological leanings, deserves greater scholarly attention.…”

“…The euro area financial crisis served as a trigger and catalyst of significant reforms in the EU economic policy. The new coordination framework innovates and reinforces the pre‐existing instruments through stringent timing, more restrictions upon national authorities and more policy prerogatives upon the Commission (Franchino and Mariotto, 2020). The European Semester has become the new tool for the economic policy coordination between the supranational institutions and member countries.…”

Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance

“…However, the Council is frequently involved in enforcement as well, especially in economic policy (Franchino and Mariotto, 2020;Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). What explains a preference for more Commission-based rather than Council-based enforcement?…”