Politics and Judicial Assertiveness in Emerging Democracies: High Court Behavior in Malawi and Zambia

VonDoepp, Peter

doi:10.1177/106591290605900306

Cited by 26 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…What we know so far is that judicial independence in Africa varies widely and different countries have taken different pathways to achieve judicial independence. Works such as Widner (2001), VonDoepp (2006), VonDoepp andEllet (2011), Ellet (2013), and Prempeh (2017), although unrelated to the effectiveness of judiciaries in reducing electoral violence, have spoken to the evolution of the independence in African judiciaries. While Widner (2001) attributes the rise of judicial independence since the end of colonialism to the role of judges within the judiciary fighting for the independence of courts, Prempeh (2017) offers cautious optimism that the judicial constitutional revival in Africa has been curtailed by imperial presidencies that are too strong to be checked by weak legislatures.…”

Section: Theory: Judicial Systems and Electoral Violencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…While Widner (2001) attributes the rise of judicial independence since the end of colonialism to the role of judges within the judiciary fighting for the independence of courts, Prempeh (2017) offers cautious optimism that the judicial constitutional revival in Africa has been curtailed by imperial presidencies that are too strong to be checked by weak legislatures. VonDoepp (2006) and VonDoepp and Ellet (2011) examine factors that might affect judicial assertiveness suggesting that the security of tenure by the incumbent, extent of power concentration in one actor, and the level of interest in a given case by political actors will determine whether judges will choose to be assertive or exercise strategic self-restraint. In analysis of Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi, Ellet (2013) finds that judicial independence was higher in countries that had a robust civil society, a strong independent media, and a strong law society.…”

Section: Theory: Judicial Systems and Electoral Violencementioning

confidence: 99%

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The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria

Burchard¹,

Simati²

2019

cea

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Esta publicação é financiada por fundos nacionais através da FCT -Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia no âmbito do UID/CPO/03122/2013Violence occurs in a slight majority of elections held in sub-Saharan Africa. Several recent studies have examined the effectiveness of various interventions on the prevalence of violent elections; however, the role of the courts has been relatively less studied. Using data on electoral violence during the 2015 and 2019 Nigerian elections, we examine under what conditions courts can moderate election-related violence. We find that successfully challenging an election outcome in the courts is related to a reduction in the lethality of violence in the next election, but only if the courts are generally perceived as trustworthy. These findings indicate that in addition to building judicial capability, improving generalized trust in judicial institutions is key to reducing electoral violence. O papel dos tribunais na redução da violência eleitoral na NigériaA violência ocorre numa ligeira maioria das eleições realizadas na África subsariana. Vários estudos recentes têm analisado a eficácia de diversas intervenções sobre a prevalência de eleições violentas; no entanto, o papel dos tribunais tem sido relativamente menos estudado. Utilizando dados sobre a violência eleitoral durante as eleições nigerianas de 2015 e 2019, examinamos em que condições os tribunais podem moderar a violência associada às eleições. Observamos que contestar com sucesso um resultado eleitoral nos tribunais está relacionado com uma redução da letalidade da violência nas eleições seguintes, mas só se os tribunais forem comummente percebidos como confiáveis. Estes resultados indicam que além de reforçar a capacidade judicial, melhorar a confiança generalizada nas instituições judiciais é fundamental para reduzir a violência eleitoral.Palavras-chave: eleições, violência eleitoral, poder judicial, resolução de disputas, confiança institucional, Nigéria

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Section: Theory: Judicial Systems and Electoral Violencementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theory: Judicial Systems and Electoral Violencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria

Burchard¹,

Simati²

2019

cea

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…2000). Scholars argue specifically that rulings of unconstitutionality signal courts' and judges' independence (Helmke 2002, 2005; Ramseyer & Rasmusen 2001), judicial activism (Cover 1975; Dyzenhaus 1991; Dubber 1993; Fuller 1958; Ott & Buob 1993), assertiveness (VonDoepp 2006), and legitimacy to overturn older precedent (Hansford & Spriggs 2006). Although the relationship between Tribunal decision outcomes and the potential willingness of a court to defy the government is not straightforward, rulings of unconstitutionality imply that a court has enough independence and security to vote against the government without fear of the court's demise or removal of individual judges.…”

Section: Basic Patterns Of Tribunal Rulingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judicial Behavior on the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal

Carroll

Tiede

2011

J Empirical Legal Studies

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Research on judicial independence suggests that high courts can be designed to serve as external checks on political actors. However, independence from political influence does not necessarily imply incentives to use these powers. Chile's Constitutional Tribunal, while possessing significant powers, has been characterized as generally deferential to political actors. Using rulings from the Tribunal from 1990–2010, we examine whether reforms that increased the number of judges appointed by politicians and expanded the Tribunal's jurisdiction have contributed to a more assertive use of judicial review power. We find that the reforms have not produced an increased tendency to rule laws unconstitutional under abstract review. However, the new appointment structure has nevertheless increased the types of judges relatively more likely to assert this power. Specifically, after the reforms, judges appointed by elected actors were individually more likely to find laws unconstitutional than those appointed by the Supreme Court, especially on cases of concrete review of enacted laws. We also find that cases of abstract review brought by legislators have been especially associated with both unconstitutional rulings and individual judicial votes for unconstitutionality.

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“…For example, both Helmke (2002Helmke ( , 2005 and Ramseyer and Rasmusen (2001) define judicial independence as the likelihood that the judiciary will rule against the government. Von Doepp (2006), however, prefers to use the term judicial assertiveness because it is a more specific term that "depends on the kinds of cases judges are asked to decide, the level of fragmentation in the political system, and the likelihood of political turnover in the near future" (Von Doepp (2006: 391). We follow Von Doepp in the use of the term "assertiveness."…”

Section: The Significance Of Amparo Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ruling against the Executive in Amparo Cases: Evidence from the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal

Tiede¹,

Ponce²

2011

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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In this paper, we systematically analyze decisions made by the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal from 1996 to 2006 in amparo cases, which significantly impact individual rights. We ask the following question: in these types of cases, what conditions led the Tribunal to assert itself against the executive? Through an analysis of Tribunal decisions during the presidencies of Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo, we find that the Tribunal is more likely to rule against the executive, as the public's confidence in the executive decreases and as the share of congressional seats of the president's party declines. Further, the Tribunal is more willing to decide cases against the executive in areas that most pervade its docket, specifically in the areas of pensions and employment. These findings add to the comparative and American judicial politics literature by showing that high courts, even relatively weak ones, follow politics, but that case subject area and prevalence may temper this tendency.

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Politics and Judicial Assertiveness in Emerging Democracies: High Court Behavior in Malawi and Zambia

Cited by 26 publications

References 20 publications

The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria

The Role of the Courts in Mitigating Election Violence in Nigeria

Judicial Behavior on the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal

Ruling against the Executive in Amparo Cases: Evidence from the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal

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