Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier

Staniland, Paul; Mir, Asfandyar; Lalwani, Sameer

doi:10.1080/09636412.2018.1483160

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Undermining leaders’ control over a terrorist organization may furthermore undermine the prospect of peace talks. Peace agreements between the Pakistani government and terrorist groups are common: Staniland, Mir, and Lalwani (2018) document 24 individual peace deals. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that leader killing by drone may impede such agreements.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Data on peace agreements between the Pakistani government and terrorist groups and Pakistani military action against particular terrorist groups up to March 2013 were collected by Staniland, Mir, and Lalwani (2018). Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the main outcome variables of interest at the group-month level.…”

Section: Terrorist Violence and Other Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Wane of Command: Evidence on Drone Strikes and Control within Terrorist Organizations

Rigterink

2020

Am Polit Sci Rev

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This paper investigates how counterterrorism targeting terrorist leaders affects terrorist attacks. This effect is theoretically ambiguous and depends on whether terrorist groups are modeled as unitary actors or not. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) “hitting” and “missing” terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Results suggest that terrorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone “hit” on their leader compared with after a “miss.” This increase is statistically significant for 3 out of 6 months after a hit, when it ranges between 47.7% and 70.3%. Additional analysis of heterogenous effects across groups and leaders, and the impact of drone hits on the type of attack, terrorist group infighting, and splintering, suggest that principal-agent problems—(new) terrorist leaders struggling to control and discipline their operatives—account for these results better than alternative theoretical explanations.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Terrorist Violence and Other Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Wane of Command: Evidence on Drone Strikes and Control within Terrorist Organizations

Rigterink

2020

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…The Pakistan army started its first military operation against FATA in 2004 to curb terrorism. Yet, these operations suffered serious resistance; therefore, the state changed its strategy to counterterrorism and started peace dialogues with nine different groups concerning peace in FATA between 2004 and 2015 (Staniland et al, 2018). According to Zartman and Alfredson (2011), peace agreements are applicable tools in softening the prospects of the extremist groups.…”

Section: Note On Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Jirga System and Its Role in Peacebuilding and Development in Pakistan’s Terrorism-Affected Pashtun “Tribal” Districts

Alam

2021

Journal of Peacebuilding & Development

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Pakistan’s erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have suffered a lot due to terrorism and extremism after the 9/11 attacks in the United States because these areas were used by local and transnational militant groups as a haven after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. These groups attacked the security forces, the local tribal leaders, and all those who opposed them and killed, many of them to get control over these areas. This resulted in huge physical, economic, social, and psychological damages in the region. To bring the region back on the path of peace and development, Jirgas were held on the local and governmental levels. To explore the role of Jirga, this study used a qualitative method to identify and explain the factors of peace and development. This study also includes primary data where 25 participants, who are/were active and experienced in tribal customary matters, were purposively selected and interviewed through a semi-structured interview guide. Data analysis was performed by using thematic analysis techniques. This study explored that Jirga played an important role in peacebuilding and development in the form of policymaking for FATA; mobilisation for action, restoration, and rehabilitation; resolving local feuds; and the establishment of FATA University in the region. This study recommended that all reforms and efforts must be made under the priorities and needs of the people of former FATA.

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“… 11 For recent examples, see Haggard and Kaufman (2012); Sechser and Fuhrmann (2017); Staniland et al (2018); Trachtenberg (2012). …”

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confidence: 99%

The democratic embargo: regime type and proxy war

Grauer

Tierney

2022

European Journal of International Relations

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Democracies rarely fight interstate wars against one another, but democratic dyads frequently engage in hostile acts short of war, such as militarized interstate disputes and the backing of coups. Do democracies wage proxy war against other elected regimes by aiding rebels with weapons and other assistance? Scholars have found that democracies generally avoid doing so—a phenomenon we term the “democratic embargo.” However, the democratic embargo remains under-theorized. Using both datasets and close examination of purported instances of democratic aid to rebels fighting other democracies, we show that the democratic embargo is stronger than first thought. In addition, we explain the democratic embargo by arguing that strong democratic institutions prevent elected leaders from engaging in proxy war against sister regimes, and embargo violations tend to occur when democratic institutions are weak. We test our theory in two ways. First, using large-N qualitative analysis (LNQA), we examine all potential exceptions to the democratic embargo between 1945 and 2011 to establish the external validity of our claim. Second, we use case studies of the Irish decision not to aid rebels fighting the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland and Pakistan’s decision to support rebels fighting India in Kashmir to assess the internal validity of our theoretical logic. The results provide clear support for our institutional explanation of the democratic embargo. Our argument has significant implications for the democratic peace theory, the study of proxy wars, and the capacity of democracies to fight rebellions.

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Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier

Cited by 14 publications

References 29 publications

The Wane of Command: Evidence on Drone Strikes and Control within Terrorist Organizations

The Wane of Command: Evidence on Drone Strikes and Control within Terrorist Organizations

Jirga System and Its Role in Peacebuilding and Development in Pakistan’s Terrorism-Affected Pashtun “Tribal” Districts

The democratic embargo: regime type and proxy war

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