Population Uncertainty in Voluntary Contributions of Public Goods

Kim, Duk Gyoo

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2567444

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 52 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This mechanism suggests that regional output positively depends on its own stock of infrastructure and negatively on the stock of infrastructures in neighboring regions. Owing to the impact of infrastructure spillover on neighboring regions, expressways can increase urbanization rates and promote economic growth (Chandra & Thompson, 2000; Kim, 2018).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional impact and spillover effect of public infrastructure investment: An empirical study in the Yangtze River Delta, China

Zhang

et al. 2020

Growth and Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional impact and spillover effect of public infrastructure investment: An empirical study in the Yangtze River Delta, China

Zhang

et al. 2020

Growth and Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…To explore the emergence and maintenance of cooperation, several mechanisms have been proposed by PGG, such as heterogeneity [ 13 – 16 ], indirect reciprocity [ 17 – 24 ], social diversity [ 25 – 28 ], punishment [ 29 – 39 ], reward [ 38 – 50 ], reputation [ 51 – 57 ], voluntary contribution [ 58 – 62 ], population structure [ 63 – 67 ] and so on. Recently, some scholars put forward that emotions also have a significant effect on the origin and stability of cooperation [ 68 – 72 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The study on the role of dedicators on promoting cooperation in public goods game

Huang

Liao

2021

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In daily life, some people are always seen dedicating available resources to support collective activities. In this paper, we call these people who care group goals more than individual goals dedicators. Inspired by this phenomenon, we studied the role of dedicators on the evolution of cooperation in public goods game (PGG) based on a Chinese Folk Spring Festival Gala. Three types of agents were introduced into our PGG model including cooperators, defectors and dedicators. Dedicators tried to donate when the Gala was short of funds. Cooperators and defectors imitated the strategy of the highest-payoff neighbor based on the rational mechanism. And their imitating probability was modified on account of the emotional mechanism for positive effect of the dedicator’s donating behavior and negative effect of continuous poor performance. Through numerical simulations, we found that the existence of dedicators can indeed promote cooperation in PGG. It should be noted that dedicators’ willingness to donate was more important than their donation quantity in facilitating cooperation. And the stronger the emotional effect intensity of dedicators’ donating behavior was, the better. So, the selfless dedication of participants should be praised to promote cooperation by improving their emotional effect intensity. Last but not least, a reasonable activity budget was needed to sustain the highest level of cooperation.

show abstract

“…Cooperation in linear public-goods experiments decreases under population uncertainty (Kim, 2016), but is not aected in the non-linear counterpart (Ioannou and Makris, 2015). In contrast to these ndings, the exploitation of a common-pool resource decreases under population uncertainty (Au and Ngai, 2003), which may in part be explained by a convergence of diverse sharing norms to the equal division rule (Kwaadsteniet et al, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Volunteering under population uncertainty

Hillenbrand

Winter

2018

Games and Economic Behavior

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThere is ample evidence that the number of players can have an important impact on the cooperation and coordination behavior of people facing social dilemmas. With extremely few exceptions, the literature on cooperation assumes common knowledge about who is a player and how many players are involved in a certain situation. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is overly restrictive, and not even very common in realworld cooperation problems. We show theoretically and experimentally that uncertainty about the number of players in a Volunteer's Dilemma increases cooperation compared to a situation with a certain number of players. We identify additional behavioral mechanisms amplifying and impairing the eect.

show abstract

Population Uncertainty in Voluntary Contributions of Public Goods

Cited by 4 publications

References 52 publications

Regional impact and spillover effect of public infrastructure investment: An empirical study in the Yangtze River Delta, China

Regional impact and spillover effect of public infrastructure investment: An empirical study in the Yangtze River Delta, China

The study on the role of dedicators on promoting cooperation in public goods game

Volunteering under population uncertainty

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About