Populism and International Relations: (Un)predictability, personalisation, and the reinforcement of existing trends in world politics

Abstract

As populists have formed governments all over the world, it becomes imperative to study the consequences of the rise of populism for International Relations. Yet, systematic academic analyses of the international impact of populist government formation are still missing, and political commentators tend to draw conclusions from few cases of right-wing populism in the Global North. But populism – conceptualised as a ‘thin’ ideology based on anti-elitism and anti-pluralism – takes different shapes across world regions as populists combine it with different ‘thick’ ideologies. To reflect such diversity and gain more systematic insights into the global implications of populism, we focus on cases of populist government formation in the Global South. We find that populists in power are not, per se, more belligerent or less willing to engage globally than their non-populist predecessors. Factors like status seeking or a country's embeddedness in international institutions mitigate the impact of populism. Its most immediate effect concerns procedural aspects: foreign policymaking becomes more centralised and personalised – yet, not entirely unpredictable, given the importance of ‘thick’ ideologies espoused by populist parties and leaders. Rather than changing course entirely, populists in power reinforce existing trends, especially a tendency towards diversifying international partnerships.

Populist parties and foreign policy: The case of Italy’s Five Star Movement

“…Despite growing attention (Chryssogelos, 2017; Destradi and Plagemann, 2019; Verbeek and Zaslove, 2017), the relationship between populist parties and foreign policy remains understudied. This article provided its contribution to the still limited debate on the foreign policy of populist parties, focusing on the case of M5S, the major party in Italian parliament after the 2018 elections.…”

“… 1. Recent exceptions are Verbeek and Zaslove (2017), Chryssogelos (2017), and Destradi and Plagemann (2019). …”

“… 6. For a recent view on the consequences of populist parties at government over foreign policy, see especially Destradi and Plagemann (2019). …”

In search of enemies: Donald Trump’s populist foreign policy rhetoric

“…The relationship between populism and populists in government has been relatively understudied (Verbeek and Zaslove, 2017: 384). Consequently, the connections between populism and foreign policy have also been underexplored, as recent works have attempted to address (Biegon, 2019; Destradi and Plagemann, 2018, 2019; Löfflmann, 2019; Nabers and Stengel, 2019; Wojczewski, 2019). In this sense, this article aims to answer Destradi and Plagemann’s (2018: 299) call for further comparative studies on the relationship in question.…”

The populist style and public diplomacy: kayfabe as performative agonism in Trump’s Twitter posts

“…With the advancement of digitalisation, social media enable engagement with foreign publics through localising (via the choice of topic) and personalising (via personal and informal narrative) strategies. According to Destradi and Plagemann (2019), the latest wave of populism in international politics reinforces this strategy in soft power statecraft as populist leaders tend to centralise and personalise foreign policies.…”