Populism, Nationalism, and Party Politics

Abstract

Recent political events have forced an examination of ideologies of populism and nationalism in politics. In this piece, I examine literature on the post-2016 political context to illustrate why the rise of identity-based politics has surprised analysts. An understanding of identity-based parties requires a focus on both the forms by which they navigate electoral and party systems, and the content of their rhetorical appeals to publics. I consider the electoral and party systems literature, and indicate some reasons that majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to foster the dominance of identity-based politics. In such systems, large parties might become weaponized by extremist elements, and lack the potential for checks from new parties. In addition, presidential systems lack a mechanism for no confidence votes, and might also have weak checks on an extremist executive. In terms of content, populism and nationalism might draw differing boundaries to include or exclude perceived elites. However, they can otherwise align in terms of their stances against “Others,” and against individualistic or technocratic stances that may fall under the label of “liberalism.” Nationalism and populism are not simply ideologies, but can be used as strategies by elites who can successfully deploy these mobilizing rhetorical appeals.

Populism, Democracy, and Party System Change in Europe

“…They are top down, from party leaders to voters: It is cueing and manipulation by well-positioned elites that have pushed voters to change their attitudes and reject mainstream parties as corrupt (Engler 2020, Haughton & Deegan-Krause 2020 and culturally harmful (Vachudova 2020). Over time, voters react to the rhetoric of party leaders by forming and changing their preferences (Stroschein 2019). This has been especially evident in cases where incumbent ethnopopulists have captured the state administration, taken over independent media outlets, cultivated "uncivil" society (Ekiert 2020, Greskovits 2020, and exploited online social media to create an exaggerated sense of threat by broadcasting an unrelenting narrative of xenophobia and resentment (Moffitt 2016, Surowiec & Štětka 2019.…”

Nationalism and Religion in Comparative Perspective: A New Typology of National-Religious Configurations

“…The current "crisis of the liberal order," for which 2016 is often taken as a critical turning point with Britain's exit from the European Union and Donald Trump's election as the president of the United States, is similarly interpreted as the triumph of nationalism whenever it comes to conflict with liberalism (Mearsheimer 2018(Mearsheimer , 2019(Mearsheimer , 2021. The phenomenal rise of populism that accompanied the crisis of liberalism is likewise related to the nationalist and religious backlash against cosmopolitan liberalism (Stroschein 2019).…”

The Migrant Other: Exclusion without Nationalism?

“…Since populism as an ideology or technology of governance has become a vehicle for othering migrants through scapegoating rhetoric (Wodak 2015), its analysis seems a promising avenue for reconciling the place of migrants in the nationalism literature. Indeed, identity has become increasingly central to party politics and voting behavior, leading to the rise of support for populist parties (Stroschein 2019). The identity in question in most studies, however, is that of voters.…”