In societies divided on ethnic and religious lines, problems of democracy are magnified – particularly where groups are mobilized into parties. With the principle of majority rule, minorities should be less willing to endorse democratic institutions where their parties persistently lose elections. While such problems should also hamper transitions to democracy, several diverse Eastern European states have formed democracies even under these conditions. In this book, Sherrill Stroschein argues that sustained protest and contention by ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia brought concessions on policies that they could not achieve through the ballot box, in contrast to Transcarpathia, Ukraine. In Romania and Slovakia, contention during the 1990s made each group accustomed to each other's claims and aware of the degree to which each could push its own. Ethnic contention became a de facto deliberative process that fostered a moderation of group stances, allowing democratic consolidation to slowly and organically take root.

No abstract

When and where might ethnic party outbidding occur? This article examines potential outbidding dynamics via a study of local elections in Romania, where the dominant Hungarian UDMR/RMDSz (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania) was recently challenged by a rival party, the MPP (Hungarian Citizens' Party). A comparison of election results is made across cities and counties that differ according to demographic characteristics. Two primary findings emerge. First, Hungarian unity in the form of the RMDSz remained strong except under enclave conditions -where the ethnic minority is the local majority. Outbidding is more likely to be a luxury of enclave regions, where fragmentation will not involve a loss of power to another ethnic group, as could happen to a local minority or with 'split' demographics. Second, when majority-minority demographics are clear, cross-ethnic formal or informal coalitions are more likely to emerge. Cross-ethnic coalitions are rare under conditions of 'split' demographics, which exhibit a logic of ethnic polarization.

Recent political events have forced an examination of ideologies of populism and nationalism in politics. In this piece, I examine literature on the post-2016 political context to illustrate why the rise of identity-based politics has surprised analysts. An understanding of identity-based parties requires a focus on both the forms by which they navigate electoral and party systems, and the content of their rhetorical appeals to publics. I consider the electoral and party systems literature, and indicate some reasons that majoritarian electoral systems are more likely to foster the dominance of identity-based politics. In such systems, large parties might become weaponized by extremist elements, and lack the potential for checks from new parties. In addition, presidential systems lack a mechanism for no confidence votes, and might also have weak checks on an extremist executive. In terms of content, populism and nationalism might draw differing boundaries to include or exclude perceived elites. However, they can otherwise align in terms of their stances against “Others,” and against individualistic or technocratic stances that may fall under the label of “liberalism.” Nationalism and populism are not simply ideologies, but can be used as strategies by elites who can successfully deploy these mobilizing rhetorical appeals.

Liberal pluralists have argued that minority cultural communities are necessary for the liberty of minorities. On the premise that individual rights are insufficient to protect these cultural communities, they argue that ethnic and national groups should be allocated some type of collective autonomy. In this article, we critically examine this claim through a discussion of policies regarding Hungarian minorities. We show that liberal pluralist approaches (1) privilege ethnic and national identities over other types of communal identities, (2) require that ethnic and national communities be clearly bounded, but do not address how lines should be drawn, and (3) increase the power of cultural communities over their members. Policies based on liberal pluralist ideas therefore violate principles of equality and are likely to harm the autonomy of individuals. Rather than looking to liberal pluralist theories as a panacea for minority concerns, we demonstrate why we should be sceptical about this effort to move beyond minority protections based on individual rights.Democratic theory has long wrestled with the possibility of majorities infringing on the liberty of minorities, a particularly salient concern when majorities and minorities are cultural groups. Even in long-established democracies, controversy remains over how permanent cultural minorities should be governed, sustaining debates about the nature of rights and justice, the importance of cultural identity, and the means to determine the boundaries of political communities. Since 1989 these debates have raged throughout East Central Europe, where multiethnic states remain in the process of constructing new democratic institutions. For Hungary and its neighbors, the Nations and Nationalism 11 (2), 2005, 285-305. r ASEN 2005 n We are grateful to the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) and the Ohio University Research Committee for research funds for this project. We are also grateful to Ira Katznelson, Charles Tilly, Debbie Schildkraut, Vicki Hseuh, Zsuzsa Csergo and Margit Bessenyey Williams for helpful comments on previous drafts. We would like to especially thank Bala´zs Jara´bik, Center for Legal Analysis (Bratislava) for his insights on Hungarian issues in Slovakia.