Post‐disaster Cooperation Among Aid Agencies

Heetun, Shameem; Phillips, Fred; Park, Sehee

doi:10.1002/sres.2476

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 29 publications

(40 reference statements)

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“…Additionally, evolutionary game theory is applied to solve CG problems in emergency management. Early studies are mainly focused on two game participants, as Heetun et al (2018) conducted a game study on the collaborative behavior between different voluntary organizations. Focusing on the important part of public participation in government emergency response, Du and Qian (2016) and Huang and Gao (2020) proposed different game analyses toward governments and voluntary organizations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis for multi‐level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective

Chen,

Liu,

Tadikamalla

et al. 2023

Risk Analysis

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In a risk society, the survival and development of humans are facing threats of complex and severe public crisis events. Public participation in collaborative governance (CG) of public crisis events is increasingly recognized as an important direction for the reform of the current and future emergency management system. Previous studies of CG have mainly focused on the macro level and ignored to address micro‐level discussions of the behavioral strategy evolution of stakeholders. From a fresh value perception perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model to clarify the evolution mechanism of multi‐level emergency CG. First, the value perception model is built based on Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting to optimize the traditional game matrix. Second, the evolutionary stability is analyzed to solve the system evolution law. Finally, numerical simulation is conducted in the case of Heilongjiang province, a main region of food and energy supply in China. Results showed that (1) the CG game system has a complex evolutionary path; (2) the behavior of game players is affected by perceived incomes and perceived costs; (3) compared with the reference value and the risk aversion coefficient of income accounts, game players are more sensitive to that of cost accounts; (4) enhancing the perceived value of public psychological satisfaction and government reputation is helpful for the long‐term construction of CG. Overall, this study aims to highlight the potential utility of value perception in promoting effective implementations of CG and to provide new insights for the development of CG in China and other countries.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game analysis for multi‐level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective

Chen,

Liu,

Tadikamalla

et al. 2023

Risk Analysis

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A tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency supplies joint reserve among the government, enterprise and society

Zhang

Kong

2022

Computers & Industrial Engineering

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Influence of the Government Department on the Production Capacity Reserve of Emergency Enterprises Based on Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game

et al. 2022

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With the frequent occurrence of world emergency events, the emergency management of government departments in various countries is facing great challenges. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of various emergency resources is prominent, and the emergency supplies reserve combined by governments and enterprises is an important guarantee for dealing with emergency management problems. This paper mainly studies the impact of a government sustainability-oriented innovation policy on the production capacity reserve of security emergency enterprises (SEEs), and constructs an evolutionary game model between the local government and SEEs. Then, it focuses on the impact of a reputation mechanism on the government enterprise cooperative reserve. According to the condition of a country, the central government’s punishment mechanism is introduced, and the evolutionary and stable strategies of the behavior choices of the local government and SEEs are compared and analyzed. Combined with the evolution degree of emergency events, the numerical simulation analysis is used to deduce and simulate the multi scenario of the example model. The results show that the reputation mechanism can effectively promote the evolution of government and enterprises to the ideal state under various scenarios. When the punishment intensity of the central government is higher than the total benefit of the implementation of the mere formality policy by the local government, it can effectively prevent the omission of the local government. This study provides a new idea for the government to formulate reasonable policies to promote SEEs to reserve production capacity, which is more conducive to government enterprise cooperation to deal with emergency events.

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Post‐disaster Cooperation Among Aid Agencies

Cited by 3 publications

References 29 publications

Evolutionary game analysis for multi‐level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective

Evolutionary game analysis for multi‐level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective

A tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency supplies joint reserve among the government, enterprise and society

Influence of the Government Department on the Production Capacity Reserve of Emergency Enterprises Based on Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game

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