The Sociotechnical Constitution of Resilience 2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-8509-3_9
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Post-Fukushima Controversy on SPEEDI System: Contested Imaginary of Real-Time Simulation Technology for Emergency Radiation Protection

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Cited by 8 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Regarding these three cases, the authors in their previous studies found that the "already known" problems among the relevant experts have either not been considered, or have been ignored in the post-Fukushima controversies and policy process. 9,10 After the descriptive case studies, we then extract the three common features observed across the cases at the intersection of science, technology, and society: avoiding critical conflicts and dilemmas, proclivity toward automated decision making, and strategic overlooking of "uncomfortable knowledge." Finally, based on these findings, we attempt to conceptualize the mechanism of that phenomenon as "structural ignorance" of expertise, with reference to other works and conceptual frameworks in social scientific scholarship.…”
Section: Scope and Methods Of The Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Regarding these three cases, the authors in their previous studies found that the "already known" problems among the relevant experts have either not been considered, or have been ignored in the post-Fukushima controversies and policy process. 9,10 After the descriptive case studies, we then extract the three common features observed across the cases at the intersection of science, technology, and society: avoiding critical conflicts and dilemmas, proclivity toward automated decision making, and strategic overlooking of "uncomfortable knowledge." Finally, based on these findings, we attempt to conceptualize the mechanism of that phenomenon as "structural ignorance" of expertise, with reference to other works and conceptual frameworks in social scientific scholarship.…”
Section: Scope and Methods Of The Studymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These maps were expected to provide bases for emergency decisions, including stay-at-home and evacuation orders (Misawa and Nagamori 2008). ERSS and SPEEDI were deeply institutionalized into the management framework as if their scientific prediction methods were indisputable ways of developing protective actions against nuclear disasters (Sugawara and Juraku 2018).…”
Section: System For Prediction Of Environmental Emergency Dose Inform...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…If any actual measurement value exceeded preset criteria, the level of emergency was mechanically decided. This would automatically trigger the necessary course of action without requiring estimations and judgments from experts or politicians (Sugawara and Juraku 2018). This shift from dependence on predictive simulations to a reliance on the preset criteria-based approach, or from anticipated potentials to limited actuals , shows a similar trajectory to that in the case of the SIR model.…”
Section: System For Prediction Of Environmental Emergency Dose Inform...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Without reliable data about the magnitude and timing of the releases, predicting plumes and depositions is even more uncertain. SPEEDI was supposed to perform these modeling calculations; however, no data and information from these predictions were made available out of fear that they might be wrong (28). The first systematic and large-area surveillance of radioactive contamination was carried out by AMS, which commenced measurements on Thursday, March 17.…”
Section: Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Accident and Immediate Impact And Responsementioning
confidence: 99%