Postquantum Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer Protocol Based on LWE

Abstract

We propose postquantum universal composable (UC) cut-and-choose oblivious transfer (CCOT) protocol under the malicious adversary model. In secure two-party computation, we construct s copies’ garbled circuits, including half check circuit and half evaluation circuit. The sender can transfer the key to the receiver by CCOT protocol. Compared to PVW-OT [6] framework, we invoke WQ-OT [35] framework with reusability of common random string ( crs ) and better security. Relying on LWE’s assumption and the property of the Rounding function, we construct an UC-CCOT protocol, which can resist quantum attack in secure two-party computation.

Post‐quantum secure two‐party computing protocols against malicious adversaries

“…This paper proposes an LWE-based BSCCOT sub-protocol for Yao's protocol, which is based on Ding et al protocol. 25 In the protocol of literature, 25 P 1 (the sender) inputs the s-pair garbled key {(y 0,j , y 1,j )} s j=1 ∈ {0, 1} n , which corresponds to the same input wire of P 2 (the receiver) in all gate circuits (GCs). P 2 inputs the selection bits 𝜎 1 , … , 𝜎 s ∈ {0, 1} and a set of check circuit indexes  ⊂ [s] of size s∕2.…”

“…In this way, the protocol is able to ensure that it remains secure in the post‐quantum era. This paper proposes an LWE‐based BSCCOT sub‐protocol for Yao's protocol, which is based on Ding et al protocol 25 . In the protocol of literature, 25 $$$ {P}_1 $$$(the sender) inputs the $$$ s $$$‐pair garbled key $$$ {\left\{\left({\boldsymbol{y}}_{0,j},{\boldsymbol{y}}_{1,j}\right)\right\}}_{j=1}^s\in {\left\{0,1\right\}}^n $$$, which corresponds to the same input wire of $$$ {P}_2 $$$(the receiver) in all gate circuits (GCs).…”

“…This paper proposes an LWE‐based BSCCOT sub‐protocol for Yao's protocol, which is based on Ding et al protocol 25 . In the protocol of literature, 25 $$$ {P}_1 $$$(the sender) inputs the $$$ s $$$‐pair garbled key $$$ {\left\{\left({\boldsymbol{y}}_{0,j},{\boldsymbol{y}}_{1,j}\right)\right\}}_{j=1}^s\in {\left\{0,1\right\}}^n $$$, which corresponds to the same input wire of $$$ {P}_2 $$$(the receiver) in all gate circuits (GCs). $$$ {P}_2 $$$ inputs the selection bits $$$ {\sigma}_1,\dots, {\sigma}_s\in \left\{0,1\right\} $$$ and a set of check circuit indexes of size $$$ s/2 $$$.…”

“…24 These pieces, however, did not use the Cut-and-Choose method. More recently, Ding et al 25 developed a post-quantum secure universally composable (UC) CCOT protocol by utilizing the WQ-OT framework. 26 The protocol is built on the LWE assumption on lattices and employs relevant properties of rounding functions.…”

LPS-ORAM: Perfectly Secure Oblivious RAM with Logarithmic Bandwidth Overhead

“…Nevertheless, these early ORAM solutions are not viewed favorably by most researchers due to the poor efficiency. Since then, a large number of ORAM solutions [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26] have been put forward to make the efficiency better. Among them, Path ORAM [13] algorithm is very simple and very efficient in logarithmic bandwidth overhead, so it is excellent.…”