Potential Signatures of Semi-volatile Compounds Associated With Nuclear Processing

Probasco, Kathleen M.; Birnbaum, Jerome C.; Maughan, A.D.

doi:10.2172/957378

Cited by 5 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Chemicals with low environmental stability must be detected and measured quickly after release or they may be converted to a chemical by-product that is not useful for the process identification. The Probasco et al (2002) study cited previously also reported results of a similar stability/uniqueness assessment for volatile effluents from nuclear material processing.…”

Section: Chemical Attributes Tablesmentioning

confidence: 70%

Technology Gap Analysis for the Detection of Process Signatures Using Less Than Remote Methods

Hartman¹,

Atkinson²,

Lind³

et al. 2005

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SummaryAlthough remote sensing methods offer advantages for monitoring important illicit process activities, remote and stand-off technologies cannot successfully detect all important processes with the sensitivity and certainty that is desired. The main scope of the program is observables, with a primary focus on chemical signatures. A number of key process signatures elude remote or stand-off detection for a variety of reasons (e.g., heavy particulate emissions that do not propagate far enough for detection at stand-off distances, semi-volatile chemicals that do not tend to vaporize and remain in the environment near the source, etc.). Some of these compounds can provide persistent, process-specific information that is not available through remote techniques; however, the associated measurement technologies have their own set of advantages, disadvantages and technical challenges that may need to be overcome before additional signature data can be effectively and reliably exploited.The main objective of this report is to describe a process to identify high impact technology gaps for important less-than-remote detection applications. The subsequent analysis focuses on the technology development needed to enable exploitation of important process signatures. The evaluation process that was developed involves three interrelated and often conflicting requirements generation activities:• Identification of target signature chemicals with unique intelligence value and associated attributes as mitigated by environmentally influenced fate and transport effects (i.e., what can you expect to actually find that has intelligence value, where do you need to look for it and what sensitivity and selectivity do you need to see it)• Identification of end-user deployment scenario possibilities and constraints with a focus on alternative detection requirements, timing issues, logistical consideration, and training requirements for a successful measurement• Identification of available measurement technology alternatives and associated attributes (available off-the-shelf, in near-term development, likely longer-term development and research-phase possibilities).Assembling these requirements into attribute versus generic acceptance criteria level tables and then comparing related attributes between tables allows for rapid visualization of technology gaps and gross estimates of the gap size. By simply weighting the attributes and the requirements in various ways, one can also derive the importance of the identified technology gaps. This output can provide the basis for both a near-term technology development roadmap and research focus as well as a decision support tool for selecting the "most likely to succeed" approach.The evaluation process as presented is generally applicable for the determination of measurement technology gaps for a broad range of applications [e.g., nuclear weapons processes, chemical weapons production, and biological weapons production, as well as classical signature categories (e.g., chemical and radionuclide s...

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Section: Chemical Attributes Tablesmentioning

confidence: 70%

Technology Gap Analysis for the Detection of Process Signatures Using Less Than Remote Methods

Hartman¹,

Atkinson²,

Lind³

et al. 2005

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“…In general, organophosphorus compounds have similarly poor volatility to long-chained amines but have lower persistence as they are subject to photo-and bacterial decomposition. A table of these compounds, decomposition products, and calculated vapor pressures was published by Probasco et al (2002).…”

Section: Chemical Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even if effluents are individually nonspecific, such as acidic gases, certain mixtures of effluents may be specific for reprocessing. A catalog of chemical variants has been published (Probasco et al 2002), and a study of source terms is now publicly available (Birnbaum et al 2004). Considerable research will be needed to discern which of the many hundreds of species are reliable and detectable signatures.…”

Section: Reprocessingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

Kemp

2016

Annu. Rev. Earth Planet. Sci.

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Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

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“…The high-volume chemicals used in these processes that may provide good probative information can be radiological, volatile, or semi-volatile. A comparison was made on more than 220 chemicals that are used in various processes throughout the nuclear fuel cycle (Probasco et al 2002, Birnbaum et al 2004 ). Semi-volatile chemicals are used in almost all facets of this cycle including raw material acquisition, isotope enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor operations, actinide separations, and device manufacturing.…”

Section: Chemicals Used In Nuclear Fuel Processingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Chemicals in the existing database (Probasco et al 2002, Birnbaum et al 2004 ) were evaluated on the basis of two criteria that are important for determining the promising options for effluent detection.…”

Section: Chemicals Used In Nuclear Fuel Processingmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Case for Employing Near-field Measurements to Detect Important Effluents from Nuclear Material Processing Operations

Hartman¹,

Kelly²,

Birnbaum³

2007

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SummaryThe proliferation of nuclear weapons is a major international security threat. It is important to be able to detect nuclear processing operations that could enable either proliferant nations or subnational groups to obtain materials needed to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. In the ideal world, detection technologies would be available that could reliably detect, locate, and quantify all targeted reprocessing operations from large standoff distances. But this "magic tri-corder" technology does not exist. Monitoring may be performed by a combination of remote (i.e., large standoff distances), intermediate range, and near-field measurements. In situations where cooperative monitoring is practical, the intermediate and near-field measurements may be fairly easy to implement. In non-cooperative situations, the intermediate and near-field measurements are necessarily more challenging.Chemical effluents released to the environment from nuclear processing plants can provide evidence of on-going processing operations. For some persistent effluents, environmental residuals can provide evidence of former operations. While the effluents may be monitored for occupational safety or environmental compliance, they may also be exploited to gain insights into the operations that produced effluents.Critical processes targeted in this report include chemical reprocessing operations that extract plutonium (Pu) and other Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) from irradiated nuclear fuel. Further, the report focuses on the opportunity to exploit important, persistent process chemical effluent signatures that can be found near nuclear material processing plants and their supporting facilities to support more effective nuclear non-proliferation monitoring.The U.S. PUREX (Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by EXtraction) process and operations serve as the basis for this discussion as the PUREX process was disclosed during the Atoms for Peace era, and it has been adopted by many nations in the subsequent years. This report describes:• Key chemical groups employed in the PUREX and nuclear materials reprocessing operations that offer significant process insights and exhibit persistence in the environment after release from the facility;• Effluent release sources from the Hanford PUREX operation and its associated support facilities;• Plume propagation after the effluent plumes are released from process stacks and the probability that under some common atmospheric conditions, the plume likely reaches the ground within several kilometers of the stack;• The importance of considering the fate of chemicals in the environment to ensure that detection methods target viable signatures and in likely locations in the environment; and• Results of a preliminary analysis of soil samples collected near the Hanford PUREX plant and its associated supporting facilities that confirmed the presence of persistent chemical residues indicative of the PUREX plant processes.iii In summary, the near-field domain around potential nuclear material reprocessing oper...

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Potential Signatures of Semi-volatile Compounds Associated With Nuclear Processing

Cited by 5 publications

References 49 publications

Technology Gap Analysis for the Detection of Process Signatures Using Less Than Remote Methods

Technology Gap Analysis for the Detection of Process Signatures Using Less Than Remote Methods

Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

A Case for Employing Near-field Measurements to Detect Important Effluents from Nuclear Material Processing Operations

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