Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

Abstract

Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

“…The third finding, finally, advocates for not only focusing on those activities that are easiest to detect, but to take into account also the timing of eventual detection. This contrasts with recent efforts in both counter‐terrorism (Lasoen, ) and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (Kemp, ), where considerable attention goes to monitoring tasks that are relatively easy to detect but occur late in the project.…”

“…Under the Comprehensive Nuclear‐Test‐Ban Treaty, considerable attention goes to the monitoring of nuclear tests (The Economist, ). While these tests are relatively easy to detect, Kemp () rightfully points out that “for many security objectives, detecting a nuclear detonation comes too late” and that “[m]ore useful would be an ability to detect nuclear weapon programs well before the achievement of a nuclear device.” In this section, we use the nuclear weapons development project of Harney et al () to demonstrate how our methods support defending countries in trading off time and ease of detection when deciding which activities to monitor.…”

Formation of Aerosol Nanoparticles by Gas-Phase Hydrolysis Reaction of Uranium Hexafluoride

“…The uranyl ion forms solid salt species (e.g., UO2F2) (called "particles" or "particulate matter" hereafter) that are generally not a commodity to the nuclear industry but play a key intermediate role in UF6 applications, such as in the production of UO2 powder for nuclear fuel production (Hou et al 2007, Lind et al 2010 or in the verification of weapons declarations as a unique tracer for nuclear sites (Kemp 2008(Kemp , 2016. Therefore, it is of great importance to improve our understanding of the formation mechanism and the evolution of properties of this particulate species in nuclear manufacturing processes and its fate as they are produced in relevant environmental conditions.…”

“…(Schotte 1987, Hanna et al 1991, Witlox 1994a, 1994b, West and Axler 1995, Giannissi et al 2013, Cheng 2018. The intermediate by-product UO2F2 is typically of less interest but has been suggested for use as a tracer for identifying sources involved in nuclear fuel processing and nuclear forensics (Kemp 2008(Kemp , 2016.…”

Colorimetric Sensor Arrays for the Detection and Identification of Chemical Weapons and Explosives

“…Chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear/explosive (CBRNE) (Kemp, 2016 ; Švábenská, 2012 ; Veerabuthiran and Razdan, 2011 ) agents pose significant threats in the 21st century, especially for armed forces and first responders such as police, firefighters, and other emergency personnel. These responders require quick, sensitive, and selective detection systems that can be used to identify and potentially quantify specific compounds.…”