Power-Sharing and Consociational Theory

Kelly, Brighid Brooks

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-14191-2

Cited by 14 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…For instance, Selway and Templeman use, besides additive models, a multiplicative specification of consociationalism, consisting of proportional electoral systems, parliamentarism, and federalism (Selway & Templeman, 2012). Kelly applies factor analysis, multivariate regressions, and case studies to evaluate the effect of consociationalism on political stability (Kelly, 2019). In assessing the effect of territorial self‐governance on the incidence of violent territorial conflict, Neudorfer, Theuerkauf, and Wolff investigate the interaction effects of self‐rule, proportional electoral systems, and parliamentarism (Neudorfer et al, 2020).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self‐Ruleand Intrastate Conflict Risk in Divided Societies: A Configurational Analysis of Consociational Institutions

Schulte

Trinn

2022

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Scholars debate whether self-rule is conducive to intrastate violence or peace. We argue that to resolve this problem the entire institutional setup of the state must be taken into account. Whereas the centripetalist view deemphasizes self-rule as a vehicle of interethnic competition, consociationalism holds that it is the interplay of accommodative institutions, with segmental autonomy among them, that promotes intrastate peace. We test these rivaling expectations on a set of 556 subnational cases in 21 culturally fractionalized post-war anocracies. We conduct a configurational risk analysis, which allows us to study self-rule and conflict risk under various institutional arrangements. We find that the full consociational 'package' is indeed associated with a reduction of intrastate conflict risk. However, majoritarian configurations are equally associated with a risk reduction. In contrast, models that include self-rule alone, or in combination with few other consociational elements, are consistently associated with an increase of conflict risk. ZusammenfassungEs bleibt umstritten, ob territoriale Autonomie das Risiko innerstaatlicher Gewalt reduziert. Während der Zentripetalismus diesbezüglich eine kritische Position

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self‐Ruleand Intrastate Conflict Risk in Divided Societies: A Configurational Analysis of Consociational Institutions

Schulte

Trinn

2022

Swiss Political Sci Review

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“…This tribal interpretation leads logically to 2) a prescription of segregation alongside reinforcement of the pillars of the plural society and rule by elite cartel. This is because while ‘good social fences may make good political neighbours, a kind of voluntary apartheid policy may be the most appropriate solution for a divided society’ (Lijphart 1971:11; see also Kelly 2019).…”

Section: Classic Consociationalism: ‘A Kind Of Voluntary Apartheid’mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Similarly, the New Generation of consociationalists do not seem concerned at the provenance of the theory, its incoherence, or its contradictions. There is a diplomatic silence about these contradictory interpretations among consociationalism’s leading authorities (Kelly 2019; McCulloch 2014: 5, 18).…”

Section: Is Consociationalism a Success?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Power‐Sharing in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism and Sectarian Authoritarianism

Dixon

2020

Studies Ethnicity & National

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Consociationalists have traditionally embraced sectarian authoritarianism combined with a very limited form of democracy as the only democratic way of managing plural conflicts. New Generation consociationalists, by contrast, believe their theory is compatible with opposing sectarian authoritarianism in places like Iraq and the Lebanon. Traditional consociationalists have tended to claim that all power-sharing is consociational, whereas revisionist and liberal consociationalists claim that consociationalism does not require power-sharing and that the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 is therefore a consociational success. This paper argues that 'classic' consociationalism has constantly been revised to deflect criticism and capture apparently successful cases of conflict management. Consociationalists have deployed a 'Wonderland' definition which allows them to make such contradictory claims. Paradoxically, this definitional ambiguity and incoherence allows consociationalism to be 'all things to all people', resulting in its successful domination of the academic debate. Consociationalism in Wonderland The protests taking place in Lebanon and Iraq in 2019 and 2020 are protests against what Toby Dodge has appropriately called 'sectarian authoritarianism' (Dodge 2012). Yet the 'New Generation' of consociationalists, including Allison McCulloch and John Nagle, claim to support the revolutionary struggle against the sectarian ruling elites of Lebanon and Iraq (McCulloch 2014; but contrast Nagle and Clancy 2012 with Nagle 2020 in this issue and the critique of Nagle and Clancy in Dixon 2011). This is puzzling, because

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“…In the context of this study, the success of the consociational agreement is measured against the concept of political stability encompassing four dimensions: (1) the level of political violence and tensions within society, including political assassination and violent demonstrations, (2) the propensity of regime or government change, (3) the instability of policies including a high frequency of changes (Kostad 2007), and (4) the presence of sectarian tensions since the agreement's signature. Literature on post-1998 Northern Ireland accounts for a relatively high level of political stability, with the decommissioning of the paramilitary force IRA (Irish Republican Army), the settlement and solidity of policies on welfare reform and finance, the regime stability, and the absence of major sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants since 1998 (Kelly 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Relative Success of Consociational Institutions in Deeply Divided Societies

Bernadaux

2020

IAPSS Politikon

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Lebanon and Northern Ireland conjure opposite images on consociationalism in the minds of many political scientists. While in Lebanon, the consociational system widely proved inefficient in preventing the outbreak of ethno-national conflicts, the Northern Ireland’s experience of consociationalism remains vastly positive. Following a “Most Similar Systems Design” defined by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (2000), this research note tests the hypothesis that the positive nature of exogenous influences participates to a higher political stability in Northern Ireland relative to Lebanon, where external influences of negative nature had the reverse effect. For the sake of this study, the developments taking place after the signature of the agreements shaping both consociational systems – the Ta’if Agreement of 1989 in Lebanon and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 in Northern Ireland – are analysed through a particular focus on elites’ external relations with patron states and their interactions with their regional or global environments.

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Power-Sharing and Consociational Theory

Cited by 14 publications

References 0 publications

Self‐Ruleand Intrastate Conflict Risk in Divided Societies: A Configurational Analysis of Consociational Institutions

Self‐Ruleand Intrastate Conflict Risk in Divided Societies: A Configurational Analysis of Consociational Institutions

Power‐Sharing in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism and Sectarian Authoritarianism

The Relative Success of Consociational Institutions in Deeply Divided Societies

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