Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks

Johnson, Jay; Quiroz, Jimmy Edward; Concepcion, Ricky James; Wilches-Bernal, Felipe; Reno, Matthew J.

doi:10.1049/iet-cps.2018.5014

Cited by 44 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In [18], an attempt is conducted to investigate the impact on the cyber-physical power grid in cases where communications and operations of distributed energy resources are manipulated by an adversary. In [19], research is conducted to assess the dynamic impacts of hypothesised cyber attacks on substations and concluded that the dynamic study is more capable in detecting cascading failure due to cyber attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber attacks in smart grid – dynamic impacts, analyses and recommendations

Amin

Taghizadeh

Rahman³

et al. 2020

IET cyber-phys. syst.

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Cyber attacks can cause cascading failures and blackouts in smart grids. Therefore, it is highly necessary to identify the types, impacts and solutions of cyber attacks to ensure the secure operation of power systems. As a well-known practice, steady-state analysis is commonly used to identify cyber attacks and provide effective solutions. However, it cannot fully cover non-linear behaviours and cascaded blackouts of the system caused by dynamic perturbations, as well as provide a postdisturbance operating point. This study presents a novel approach based on dynamic analysis that excludes the limitations of the steady-state analysis and can be used in the events of various cyber attacks. Four types of common attacks are reviewed, and their dynamic impacts are shown on the IEEE benchmark model of the Western System Coordinating Council system implemented in MATLAB Simulink. Then, recommendations are provided to enhance the security of the future smart power grids from the possible cyber attacks.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber attacks in smart grid – dynamic impacts, analyses and recommendations

Amin

Taghizadeh

Rahman³

et al. 2020

IET cyber-phys. syst.

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“…We use the engineering controls adapted from [54] to prevent potentially harmful Volt-VAR curves from being set by an adversary. The determination of the boundaries for allowed and disallowed points is made by the placement of V ref and the zero reactive power line, where V ref is the reference voltage.…”

Section: Volt-var Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

Culler

2021

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The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

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“…The modified settings represented situations where the PV inverters were improperly programmed to injected reactive power at high voltage. This altered setting could be disallowed in future software implementations as described by Johnson et al [14], but as of today the capability exists.…”

Section: Volt-var Curve Control Parameter Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Quiroz et al used the same OpenDSS feeder model to test VVC control strategies that countered the impact of two large PV systems [30]. The model was also used in a cyber-attack consequence tests [14], which described the impact of a potential attack on the VVC at a given integration scenario.…”

Section: Feeder Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Exploitation of the PV inverter could result in deviations from the expected reactive power output as outlined in [13]. An initial exploration study highlighted potential consequences associated with maliciously altered VVCs on the distribution and transmission system [14]. However, a more thorough review of a feeder's response to an attack at different operating conditions and the role of other grid devices, such as LTCs, has yet to be explored.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Volt-Var Curve Reactive Power Control Requirements and Risks for Feeders with Distributed Roof-Top Photovoltaic Systems

et al. 2020

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The benefits and risks associated with Volt-Var Curve (VVC) control for management of voltages in electric feeders with distributed, roof-top photovoltaic (PV) can be defined using a stochastic hosting capacity analysis methodology. Although past work showed that a PV inverter’s reactive power can improve grid voltages for large PV installations, this study adds to the past research by evaluating the control method’s impact (both good and bad) when deployed throughout the feeder within small, distributed PV systems. The stochastic hosting capacity simulation effort iterated through hundreds of load and PV generation scenarios and various control types. The simulations also tested the impact of VVCs with tampered settings to understand the potential risks associated with a cyber-attack on all of the PV inverters scattered throughout a feeder. The simulation effort found that the VVC can have an insignificant role in managing the voltage when deployed in distributed roof-top PV inverters. This type of integration strategy will result in little to no harm when subjected to a successful cyber-attack that alters the VVC settings.

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Power system effects and mitigation recommendations for DER cyberattacks

Cited by 44 publications

References 22 publications

Cyber attacks in smart grid – dynamic impacts, analyses and recommendations

Cyber attacks in smart grid – dynamic impacts, analyses and recommendations

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

Volt-Var Curve Reactive Power Control Requirements and Risks for Feeders with Distributed Roof-Top Photovoltaic Systems

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